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
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Canadian Ops - North-West Europe (Series 13)
Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda.

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2. These extracts are forwarded for gen infm only and opinions stated are not to be considered as necessarily expressions of official doctrine.
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for M.P. Johnston
(M.P. Johnston)
Lt Col, GS,
for Chief of the General Staff.

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

27 Nov 44

CANADIAN OPERATIONS - NORTH-WEST EUROPEExtracts from War Diaries and Memoranda (Series 13)

1. Further to my 24/AEF/1/3(Hist), dated 18 Nov 44, attached are additional Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda dealing with Canadian Operations in North-West Europe.
2. These Extracts are circulated for general information only, and opinions stated are not to be considered as necessarily expressions of official doctrine.

(P.J. Montague) Lieut-General,
Chief of Staff,
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24/AEF/1/3 (Hist)

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

JUNE - OCTOBER 1944

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DIARIES AND MEMORANDA


(SERIES 13)

1. THE EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN SUPPORT OF INFANTRY: LESSONS LEARNED ON THE ZUID BEVELAND PENINSULA, OCTOBER, 1944 : (ACCOUNT BY LT-COL. E.M. WILSON, O.C., 10 CDN ARMD REGT, GIVEN TO HIST OFFR 2 CDN INF DIV, 1 NOV 44).

1. With the return of "C" Sqn from the CALAIS area, where it had been supporting operations of 3 Cdn Inf Div until 30 Sep 44, the Regiment was once more complete. Thereafter, 10 Cdn Armd Regt worked with 2 Cdn Inf Div from ANTWERP up through CAPPELLEN and PUTTE to the ZUID BEVELAND isthmus, and the unit participated in the actions where stiff resistance was encountered at HOOGERHEIDE and WOENSDRECHT (8-22 Oct). 10 Cdn Armd Regt continued in support of 2 Cdn Inf Div during the period that the ZUID BEVELAND peninsula was being cleared of the enemy (23-31 Oct).
2. The marshy dyke-land WEST of WOENSDRECHT and on into the PENINSULA was not good tank country. Consequently, some variations from normal methods of deployment were necessary. On nearly all occasions the infantry were supported by a squadron or a troop of tanks; the most common formation being one troop with a battalion. Other considerations apart, this formation was necessary because of the restrictions on the choice of available roads.
3. During operations to the WEST of WOENSDRECHT one troop from 10 Cdn Armd Regt, together with a scout troop of 8 Cdn Recce Regt, supported one coy of infantry from 4 Cdn Inf Bde along the main road to the WEST (square 5420). On this occasion (24 Oct) the recce cars and tanks were employed together in advance of the infantry. But, after one 75mm gun had knocked out three recce cars and three tanks, it was decided that this type of formation was not advisable. Accordingly, in later engagements, the infantry pushed ahead with the tanks behind them. When the infantry required armoured support the tanks were then deployed on the flanks, or otherwise, to greater advantage and with less casualties.
4. The experience obtained over this difficult, boggy country indicated also that tanks could be used with considerable effect in "hull down" positions, if the infantry first blew holes for them in the dykes with grenades. The tanks could then fire through these openings behind the cover of the dykes. Indirect shoots were sometimes employed, using bursts of delayed action H.E. against dykes held by the enemy. In these cases fire was directed by an F.O.O.
5. The Sherman tanks gave an adequate performance and apart from the fact that more 17-pdrs could have been used

there was no criticism of equipment. The 75mm projectile will bounce off the front of the Panther tank; but a shot obtained from a flank with this armament has been found to be effective.

6. In a defensive role, the enemy tended to employ his tanks and A tk guns in the following pattern: his armour would reveal itself, at different points across our axis of advance, with the intention of enticing our tanks into positions where they would fall an easy prey to A tk guns situated on the flanks. These A tk guns were supported, in turn, by nests of M.G.s. The general layout was roughly as pictured below:



7. To deal with the German defence tactics, as outlined above, the following methods were employed. As soon as the A tk guns had been spotted by our troops, our artillery were called upon to knock them out. Thereafter, the tanks moved in on the flanks and cleared a passage for the infantry. Co-operation with the artillery worked very well on all occasions. The lowlands over which these actions were fought had one compensation in that communications by wireless were very good.

8. A system was devised for the speedy evacuation of casualties which seemed to work very well. Usually, a Tac H.Q. was located near the Div or Bde Tac H.Q. and the M.O. was situated there with jeeps at his disposal. If one of our tanks was knocked out, a message was sent at once to the M.O. by wireless and he came forward to attend to any casualties.

9. Probably the most important problem encountered in the course of these operations arose in connection with the question of whether, below a divisional level, tanks should be under command, or "in support", of infantry. Below the divisional level, it is essential that a tank commander should have his tanks "in support", and not under command, of the infantry. The following reasons were advanced in support of this opinion:

(a) The tank commander is a specialist and knows best how his tanks can be employed.

(b) If tanks are under command of infantry, they are often placed in a position on the ground where they cannot give the maximum support. The infantry commander tends to over-emphasize the "morale aspect", in relation to his own troops, when considering where tanks should operate. It is suggested that he should consider where he wishes fire to come down rather than where the tanks themselves should be located....

(c) When tanks are under command of infantry they are frequently sent into woods and built up areas without support. Tanks cannot hold ground once it has been captured. In some cases, particularly in the woods near HOOGERHEIDE and KORTEVEN, tanks were sent forward and captured the objective, but the infantry were not right behind them to consolidate.

(d) If tanks are under the command of infantry, there is difficulty in getting the former released in time for rest after doing the necessary maintenance on their vehicles. At the end of an action, the infantryman can dig a whole and obtain some measure of rest very quickly. But tank crews require considerable time in order to get their vehicles to a place where maintenance can be done, and the maintenance itself requires further time before rest is possible.

10. Out of the line, at rest, it is very important that armoured and infantry personnel should live together in order to exchange their viewpoints....

11. Plans for co-operation with aircraft have been made on a number of occasions, although weather conditions have hampered the actual testing of these plans. It is felt that, in an indirect shoot, a flying F.O.O. could very often act as a ranging officer for the tanks. Furthermore, he could fly ahead of tanks and look for enemy movement. It was intended to employ this method of co-operation in connection with "SAINT FORCE" (8 Oct), but a heavy mist rendered this impossible. The F.O.O. would be in direct communication by W/T with the squadron commander.

12. As far as reinforcements are concerned, this unit has not experienced any real difficulty. Casualties have been about average and close liaison has been maintained with Brig Rutherford, commanding "E" Group, C.R.U. This close liaison has prevented any difficulties arising in this connection.

2. COMBAT LESSONS FROM 8 CDN INF BDE, BASED ON EXPERIENCE IN NORMANDY. (RECEIVED FROM HIST OFFR, 3 CDN INF DIV).

1. ENEMY RESISTANCE

Small numbers of determined enemy with well sited MMGs and A.Tk guns can hold up even well laid on attacks. This can be overcome by:

- (a) Better appreciation of enemy tactics.
- (b) More infm about enemy defs.
- (c) Closer understanding between armour and inf.
- (d) Use of arty before inf gets so close to a target as to prevent arty fire.

2. DEPLOYMENT OF INF PERS AND F ECH

More thought must be given to the manner of deploying inf and the handling of F ech to secure the best results. This can be improved by:

- (a) TEWTS based on recent battles.
- (b) More time for planning.
- (c) Adequate forces for mopping up.

3. CONTROL

There is need for greater control so that more correct infm is available to comds at all levels thus enabling them to be better able to influence the battle with resources available. This requires:

- (a) Better battle procedure.
- (b) Better comms.

4. USE OF INF WEAPONS

There are occasions upon which own inf weapons, if properly positioned for the battle, can be used quickly. More thought must be given to the use of own weapons before calling for the fire of sp arms.

5. OWN ARTY BARRAGE

(a) Our tps actually require warning NOT to walk into our own barrage. This is a result of German mortar counter-barrage confusing men as to where fire is originating. (Possibility of some deceptive measures to screen actual locn of our barrages).

(b) Start lines must be crossed quickly as it is often found they are enemy DF Tasks.

6. CONTINUOUS CLOSE SP BY INF WEAPONS

3" mortars must be leap-frogged fwd so that there is always sp available as the attack progresses. It has been suggested that NOT less than two 3" mortars be placed under comd or in sp of each fwd coy and the move of these be coord with the mortars with their fwd coy so that sp may be continuous on the attack front.

7. A.TK RESOURCES ON THE OBJECTIVE

(a) It is NOT always possible to get inf 6 pdrs or the 6 pdrs and/or 17 pdrs of arty on the objective in time to fight off the enemy counter-attack. It is felt that until these arrive and have had a chance to get into posn the inf comd

should have greater control over M.10 A.tk guns or tks in sp to off-set lack of normal A.Tk guns.

(b) As accurate a forecast as possible must be made of the actual posns A.Tk guns are to take up on the objective. This may have to be done from map or photo but deserves considerable thought so that inf are NOT delayed in their digging-in and so that proper posns, protected by inf, are left for all the A.Tk guns that may be allotted to the bn fortress.

8. SLIT TRENCHES

These must be dug at the very first opportunity, and be continually improved. They should be narrow and deep with fire-steps as required, and have a splinter-proof cover of at least 2/3 of the length of the trench. The first requirement is a slit trench from which weapons can be best used. When time permits another slit trench in rear should be dug which can be used by pers when posts are NOT being manned. These two slit trenches should then be connected by a shallow crawl trench and the whole carefully camouflaged.

9. CLEARING OF VILLAGES

If the Bren teams op by themselves on the outside perimeter of the area to be cleared, firing numerous, fast bursts into enemy area from constantly changed posns, the enemy may imagine that he is being attacked by vastly superior forces, and his resistance weakened accordingly.

10. CAMOUFLAGE

Men must become more mentally alert to their surroundings and noises. It is felt that men must become far more suspicious of normally innocuous objects such as haystacks, barns, etc. The concealment of A. tk guns and crews requires special thought and track discipline must be enforced. If possible a posn within ground observation and gun range of the enemy should NOT be occupied by day except under special circumstances and then only by means NOT obvious to the enemy.

11. RELIEFS

(a) During the take-over of a posn mov of vehs should NOT take place until after all marching tps are in posn AND their slits prepared.

(b) Vehs in fwd area must be kept to a min unless adequate protection against splinters and shelling is available. It must be remembered that the presence of vehs in an area appears to have the result of bringing down a greater weight of enemy mortaring and shelling.

12. RECCE

All important for all ops - attack - relief - patrols, etc. The standard of fieldcraft can be improved and will pay big dividends.

13. PATROLS

(a) More detailed forethought is required for patrols. (Scout pl org will now be of assistance). Daylt recce and plans to the last detail must be worked out. Fighting patrols must be more aggressive and have no hesitancy in "picking a fight" and killing the enemy.

(b) Patrols should be undertaken frequently to impress all ranks that we have the initiative and can keep same by good patrolling.

14. ENEMY WEAPONS

The only weapons (enemy) that should be emp by own tps are revolvers or automatic pistols. The resultant confusion of using other weapons is NOT worth it.

15. INTERCOMN

- (a) Only accurate infm of own activities must be passed back.
- (b) In a static role RT should NOT be used as enemy appears adapt at pinpointing Coy, Bn and Bde HQs.
- (c) 18 sets are NOT reliable and other means must be improvised.

ADM

16. LOBs

The system of leaving out of battle some key pers of each unit must be a drill. It ensures continuity of regt spirit, policy, trg, etc.

17. SLIT-TRENCH COMPLEX

All tps must be out of trenches for the greater part of the day. One hr at least should be spent daily in improving posns. Fresh air is essential to good health, and morale.

3. NOTES ON COUNTER MORTAR WORK: (EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, 2 CDN C.M.O. STAFF, SEPTEMBER 1944)

INTRODUCTION

1. This unit which was formed just previous to proceeding Overseas at the end of June 44 has now been operating in the Fd for approximately two months and it is considered that it is now in a position to commit to writing a summary of its experience and some constructive thoughts on counter mortar.

SCOPE OF COUNTER MORTAR

2. The types of enemy weapons for the location of which the Counter Mortar Office is responsible has been definitely laid down. It is apparent that its responsibilities extend considerably beyond the Mortar in the pure sense of the word

3. It is probable that the weapons which this Office has been instrumental in locating and has taken action against have included Mortars, both 8.1 cm and 12 cm, fd rocket projectors of all types and inf guns of various types, particularly SP guns.

4. All of the above weapons are very mobile and consequently counter action in order to be effective must be taken as quickly as possible after they become active. It is thought that the adoption of a silent policy in respect of these weapons would have no merit whatsoever.

5. The Counter Mortar Office at Div H.Q. is admirably situated to bring down quick retaliatory fire and is also in close touch with mov of own tps on the div front. For these reasons it is submitted that the Counter Mortar Office is a more suitable agent than the Counter Bty Office for dealing with rocket projectors and Inf guns, particularly SP.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. The ability of a Counter Mortar Organization to fulfill a useful purpose depends to a very large extent upon the tactical situation.
7. When the front is stabilized and own tps are deployed in a defensive posn the need for a counter mortar organization is greatest. During the period 25 Jul 44 to 7 Aug 44 this Div was holding VERRIERES and ST ANDRE SUR ORNE and during this time this Unit was extremely busy and was able, it is believed, to carry out a very useful function.
8. In preparation for attack the Counter Mortar Office is able to supply useful infm regarding posns of enemy weapons which may be included in the fire plan.
9. Attempts have been made during the attack itself to identify as active posn previously located and to locate new posns which become active during the attack, in order that immediate neutralizing fire may be brought down. Due however to the noise of battle and to difficulties of comn reports of enemy activity cannot be obtained and these attempts have met with no success.
10. In the advance reports of enemy activity are few and the situation is generally so fluid as to preclude the engagement of enemy weapons in proximity to our own tps by unobserved fire.
11. To summarize, in defence Counter Mortar performs an extremely useful role, in preparation for attack it is in a posn to provide useful infm, during the attack itself and during the advance it is not able to be of much assistance.

METHODS OF LOCATION

12. Mortar Reports (MOREPS) - In the absence of mechanical devices this Unit has relied very largely upon Mortar reports for location. The form of the Mortar report (MOREP) is precisely the same as the Shelrep with the addition of serial "K" (time from report of discharge to sight of burst).

The chief sources of "MOREPS" were specially deployed Counter Mortar OPs, Arty OPs and fwd inf.

(a) Specially deployed Counter Mortar OPs - During the period 25 Jul 44 to 7 Aug 44 three such OPs were deployed on the Div front, personnel being supplied by 3 LAA Regt. Each OP had wireless comn direct with this office. These OPs proved exceedingly successful. They provided approximately 75% of the infm received at the Counter Mortar Office and due to the wireless link their reports were received immediately after the incident occurred.

(b) Arty OPs - A fair number of reports have been received from Arty OPs, but the time lag between the incident and the time of receipt of the report by the Counter Mortar Office has frequently been too great. Efforts were made to have at least one OP per fd regt net his flick frequency onto the CMO net in order to cut down delay, but to date this has not proved very satisfactory.

(c) Fwd Inf - The number of reports received from inf sources has been disappointing.

13. Sound bearings - It is apparent that with practice the accuracy of sound bearings received has greatly improved. While OPs have no difficulty in identifying rocket projectors due to their

distinctive noise on discharge and in flight there still exists considerable confusion between Mortars and low velocity guns. It is certain that many "MOREPS" received by Counter Mortar Office are in actual fact "Shelreps" and similarly that many shelreps received by Counter Bty Office are actually moreps.

It is suggested therefore, that all shelreps, as well as moreps, should be passed through the Counter Mortar Office which would "vet" them and pass on all bona fide shelreps to the CBO. To handle this traffic it would probably be advisable for the CBO to have a set on the shelrep frequency of the CBO. This procedure would be particularly desirable, and indeed necessary, if it is decided that the CMO is responsible for neutralization of inf guns.

14. Sound bearings in conjunction with times of flight - Limited success has been achieved by using serial "K" of the MOREP in conjunction with the sound bearing. It has been found that very rarely is the reported time of flight long enough to fit the trajectory of a mortar which adds weight to the belief that guns are frequently mistaken for mortars.

There is no doubt that the time of flight can give very good confirmatory evidence to a location found by the intersection of two sound bearings. This office has produced graphical aids for deducing the range from the time of flight reported under serial "K" but it is felt that more practical experience is required before the merits of this system can be properly assessed.

15. Flash bearings - Rocket projectors are a low angle weapon and in addition, they emit a considerable flash on discharge. Consequently, at night and at dusk it is frequently possible to obtain a flash bearing to them. With mortars, however, there is very little flash and they are normally sited with perfect flash cover.

16. Flash to bang (serial "J" of MOREP) - At dusk and during the night it has been found possible to obtain the time "flash to bang" in respect of rocket projectors and this has on many occasions proved of definite value in locating posns.

17. APIS - Infm provided by APIS has been found most useful both in confirming suspected locations and by drawing attention to localities which have subsequently been confirmed by sound bearings.

18. Arty registration from ground OPs - In several instances posns, principally, of rocket projectors have been seen and registered from ground OPs.

19. Air OP - Several sorties were made by the Air OP in order to shoot at mortars suspected of being active in a certain area, but the Air OP reported that he was unable to see the mortars in question. It is possible that by the time the Air OP was airborne the mortars had stopped firing.

20. Patrols, PWs etc. - Valuable infm was from time to time forthcoming from these sources.

APPLICATION OF COUNTER MORTAR FIRE

21. Policy - As stated in para 4 above it is considered that counter mortar policy (incl mortars, rocket projectors and SP guns) should be active at all times. Further, retaliatory fire should be brought down on all active posns with the greatest possible speed. In practice it has been found possible to retaliate with Arty fire ten minutes after a posn becomes active.

22. Form of Retaliation - Arty, both fd and med has been used almost exclusively for retaliation, although 4.2 mortars were used on one occasion to fire a harassing programme on known enemy posns close in to our FDLs.

For immediate neutralization it has been the practice normally to fire scale two from one fd or med regt.

Several harassing fire programmes were carried out but it is felt that a great deal of fire undoubtedly falls on unoccupied posns and that amn is put to far greater effect when emp on immediate neutralization.

23. Target Area - For the following two reasons this unit has adhered to the policy of engaging enemy posns by means of STONKS covering 525 yds:-

- (a) Available methods of fixation are not considered to be accurate enough to warrant bombardment with all fire directed at one map reference.
- (b) PW reports indicate that alternative posns particularly of 81 mm and 12 cm mortars are normally not more than 300 yds distant from the main posns.

The axis of the STONK is selected having regard to likely posns as shown by the map and air photos, e.g. tracks, and to the triangle of error obtained from sound bearings.

COMMUNICATIONS

24. Receipt of Infm - As mentioned in para 12 (a) specially deployed Ops were netted in with the control set at this office and infm from them, therefore, was available with a minimum of delay. It is believed that with further experience it should be possible for Arty OPs to pass infm on this net by means of their flick frequencies.

The volume of infm received from inf sources did not at any time warrant the provision of special comms between bdes and CMO.

In the event of any mechanical devices being made available for mortar location, special comms to the CMO will undoubtedly be required. This may be done either by line or by the units concerned having a wireless set on the CMO net.

25. Passage of Fire Orders - It was normal for the CMO to order bombards of enemy mortars by line comn to fd regts through div Arty exchange and to med regts either direct through div Arty exchange or through AGRA. When line was available which it was during almost all the battle SOUTH of CAEN this procedure worked quite satisfactorily. If line was not available bombards were passed over the CRA's comd net.

In some Divs a certain fire unit e.g. a hy bty, was allotted for counter mortar and it was found most satisfactory to have that fire unit on the CMO net.....

RESULTS

28. It is not easy to assess the effectiveness of counter mortar fire. Numerous reports were received indicating that fire ceased when bombards were carried out, but these reports cannot be accepted as definite proof that the fire was effective.

29. After the advance through BRETTEVILLE SUR LAIZE, certain of the more active posns located during the static period around VERRIERES and ST ANDRE SUR ORNE were visited. The results were

quite gratifying establishing beyond any doubt that enemy posns had been there and that the counter mortar fire had been effective.

9 Sep 44.

(G.P. Keeping) Capt. R.C.A.
C.M.O. 2 Cdn Inf Div.

4. MOBILE WARFARE (EXTRACTS FROM WAR DIARY, ESSEX SCOT, SEPTEMBER, 1944).

ADV. GDS

1. Outline order of march as laid down by attached sheet will be varied by experience and necessity.

SECOND OR THIRD BN

2. As laid down in att sheet. Principle is that we should be ready to take over adv gd duties with minimum waste of time.

DRESS

3. Normal battle order. Eqpt may be loosened but NOT removed. Steel helmets will be worn except on adm moves.

ALERTNESS

4. All tps must be ready to go into action quickly. Lookout on each veh will be posted. One bren gun in cab and one at tailboard of each TCV. Where coln halts sentries will be posted over the hedges with brens and PIATs on both sides of rd.

TRAFFIC DISCIPLINE

5. Vehs to maintain speed and density laid down. Whenever veh halts one man from each veh will stand as traffic sentry on opposite side of rd to veh.

FREEZING

6. In event of enemy threat either reported or actual which cannot be dealt with by the bn it may be necessary to roll up and freeze. The signal to roll up will be a continuous blast by motorcycle horn riding down the coln. The action to be taken is as follows. The leading or van gd coy rolls up where it is or on the nearest most advantageous ground. The second coy goes to the most threatened flank and rolls up while the third coy goes to the rear and least threatened flank. BHQ will go with this latter coy. 'F' Ech and Sp arms not travelling with the coys will roll up well in rear in the nearest wood or best available cover from where they will be deployed if necessary. Everyone will immediately consolidate taking up an all around def posn. While the leading or van gd coy comd has the right to institute the alarm signal great discretion must be used as the result will be that the whole coln and in many cases the whole div will be stopped with the resultant great waste of time if it is a false alarm. Normally the bn comd will issue the orders. The same procedure will be adopted when the unit is second or third bn except that the bn comd will always issue the orders for firstly freezing and secondly areas to be occupied. TCVs should be sent back by coys and OC 'Sp' coy will be responsible for harbouring them.

TACTICS FOR THE VAN GD

7. When opposition is bumped the van gd comd will immediately arrange to get fire down on the suspected posns and then if possible mop up and in any event quickly search for the flanks of the opposition so that the remainder of the bn may bypass it or an enveloping attack may be instituted. Energetic action is required on the part of all concerned and the will to get on, hit hard with fire-power and feel for the flanks, then mop it up or if beyond the van gd resources contain the enemy. To do nothing but sit down and wait is criminal.

(P.W. BENNETT) Lt Col
CO ESSEX SCOTTISH REGT

LEADING BN OF LEADING BDE

MOVING EMBUSSED

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Sub Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Carrier pl less two secs	May be reduced if flank gd required. GAP - leading TCV to keep last carrier in view not closer than 300 yds.
2.	One rifle coy F.O.O. Two dets 3" mortar Two secs inf A tk guns Assault sec pers.	Order of march as required by leading coy comd. Vehs accompanying coys will be 'F' Ech less soft skins.
3.	GAP - $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile - following may have to gap if allotted one sqn of tks. RCE Recce Party TC Element.	
4.	One pl inf. Bn 'O' Gp Rifle coy less one pl One sec inf A tk guns.	
5.	One rifle coy One tp A tk RCA	
6.	Bn HQ.	
7.	3" mortar pl less two dets.	
8.	Pl M.M.Gs.	
9.	Balance of Sp Coy plus soft skins. 'F' Ech of Coys plus one empty TCV. Travelling behind the leading bn will be: One bty fd arty One pl 4.2 mortars One pl engrs Bde 'O' Gp.	

SECOND OR THIRD BN OF LEADING BDE

MOVING EMBUSSED

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Sub Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Carrier pl less two secs.	Will probably be required for flank gd of bde.
2.	One rifle coy. F.O.O. Two dets 3" mortars Two secs inf A tk guns.	
3.	Bn 'O' Gp.	
4.	One rifle coy. One sec inf A tk guns.	
5.	One rifle coy One tp A tk guns RCA.	
6.	Bn HQ.	
7.	3" mortar less two dets.	
8.	Pl M.M.G.	
9.	Balance of Sp Coy plus soft skin vehs of coy 'F' Ech plus one empty T.C.V.	
10.	Tp L.A.A.	

In case of being third bn one sec of carriers and tp of a tk guns RCA will go in rear.

5. NOTES FOR LIAISON OFFICERS : FROM G.S. 3 CDN INF DIV.

1. LOs are NOT entirely clear as to the exact nature of their liaison duties (as opposed to those in the Ops Room) and the following notes are issued for their guidance:

2. An LO is NOT what is often described as "a glorified DR". He is selected for his intelligence, initiative and experience in order that he may interpret and amplify the orders of the commander whom he represents. It is imperative, therefore, that LOs are completely familiar with the div picture at all times and that they understand and appreciate the orders, instructions or information which they are to present.

3. As an LO your duty is only partially completed when you have presented your brief from Div HQ. You are also required to return to your commander with the subordinate commander's plan (at least in outline) or his intentions with respect to the orders he has received. In addition you must bring back the brigade or supporting arm picture in as complete detail as possible.

4. You can NOT accomplish this two-way liaison by a last minute dash from this HQ and a three or four minute visit at the HQ of the lower formation. You must be properly briefed before you leave and you must remain at the lower HQ sufficiently long to accomplish your task. As a rough guide, a visit to a brigade HQ should normally last one half hour unless you have been specifically ordered to return at once with your information.

5. An LO at Divisional HQ is the personal representative of the General Officer Commanding and as such has the right of access to the subordinate Commander. In many cases, of course, it may NOT be possible or expedient for the LO to see the brigade or supporting arm commander himself but he should at least see the Brigade Major or 2IC and be assured that the two-way liaison described in the foregoing paragraphs is a fait accompli.

6. As the personal representative of the GOC, you represent him NOT only from the GS Branch but also from the AG Branch. It is obvious therefore that you contact the AQ before leaving this HQ and the SC or adjutant of the supporting arm, when you arrive at your destination. You must also remember that Intelligence is an integral part of the General Staff and that therefore you must contact the Intelligence Staff at both ends of your trip. The presentation of Intelligence Summaries, Defence Overprints, Photographs and general intelligence information is an essential part of your duties.

7. Under normal circumstances, the GOC's intentions, plans, orders and instructions are issued through his staff. In most cases this will be done through the GSO 2 who will brief LOs when they leave this HQ. This does NOT preclude the fact that often the GOC or GSO I may brief LOs in certain specific cases. It follows therefore, that when LOs return to this HQ, they will report to the Staff Officer by whom they were briefed.

8. LOs will ensure that all the information which they have procured is recorded in the log and marked on the Ops Map.

9. LOs will NOT leave any HQ without first calling at the Signal Office for despatches.

10. One last point: remember that as a member of the staff at this HQ you are the servant of the troops and NOT the master. Let this principle be the guiding factor in all your dealings with lower formations and HQs.

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GS 3 Cdn Inf Div