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Cdn Ops - North West Europe (Series 26)

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*for* *Chas Clifford Lt Col*  
Lieutenant-General,  
Chief of the General Staff.

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DIARIES AND MEMORANDA

(SERIES 26)

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1. OPERATION "CANNONSHOT" - THE OPERATIONS OF 1 CDN INF DIV BETWEEN THE R. IJSSEL AND R. EEM 11 APR - 5 MAY 45 (FROM A REPORT PREPARED BY HIST OFFR 1 CDN INF DIV). (See Sketch Map: GSGS 2541, 1:100,000 Sheet 2; GSGS 4416, 1:100,000 Sheet Pl; GSGS 4427, 1:25,000 Sheets 369-71, 377-9, 387-8; GSGS 4414, 1:25,000 Sheets 3602, 3702.)

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENT AND GENERAL SITUATION

1. On 3 and 4 Apr the div moved from its res area outside of BRUSSELS (Div HQ being at ITIGHEN J8983) in which area it had assembled after leaving ITALY, to the REICHSWALD FOREST L8030 in GERMANY, where it conc for Op CANNONSHOT. With the movement to the REICHSWALD FOREST, the div came under comd 2 Cdn Corps, comd by Lt-Gen G.G. SIMONDS, CB, CBE, DSO. At this time personnel again put up their div patches and unit badges, and the general plan for the forthcoming op was communicated to the bdes. On 7 Apr, the div moved to a conc area near BAAK in HOLLAND, crossing the R. RHINE on a 1,280 ft pontoon br at EMMERICH. On 8 Apr, the Army Comd, Gen H.D.G. CRERAR, CB, DSO, and the Comd of 2 Cdn Corps, conferred with Maj-Gen H.W. FOSTER, DSO, the div comd, at div HQ.

2. On 9 Apr, 2 Cdn Inf Bde moved to a conc area NE of ZUTPHEN 9495, which town had been captured the preceding day by 3 Cdn Inf Div. On the afternoon of 10 Apr, 7 Cdn Inf Bde completed the occupation of DEVENTER 9108, where resistance had collapsed. The two chief towns WEST of R.IJSSEL, between which the 1 Cdn Inf Div attack was to be launched, having now been taken, the div was committed to its first action in NW EUROPE.

3. The general situation as regards the enemy was such that he could no longer successfully withdraw his tps from Western HOLLAND, and had apparently chosen to fight a separate WEST HOLLAND battle, standing first on the IJSSEL and then on the "GREBBE LINE". (The "GREBBE LINE" was based on the river valleys of the R. GREBBE in the SOUTH and the R. EEM in the NORTH, together with the marshy polderland bordering the IJSSELMEER) Small groups of coy size or less were withdrawing

WEST and NW behind the R. IJSSEL. It was evident that the enemy intended to resist along the line of this river on the WEST as he had resisted on the TWENTE CANAL. There seemed to be no particular enemy plan of withdrawal; his tactics were based on locally resisting groups. Civs reported that in the city of APELDOORN alone there was a garrison of some, 1,500 mixed tps. "Although the terms 'hodge-podge', 'odds and sods', 'scrapings', etc., are accepted epithets for such an order of battle as he now discloses on our front, the skill and fighting spirit of individual units has often been up to the standard of elite tps. Even though the soldiers are often youths from trg centres, they are fanatical and brave. Offr instructors from trg units have provided the highest standard of leadership". (2 Cdn Corps IS 153 - quoted in 1 Cdn Inf Div IS No. 135 7 Apr 45)

#### PLAN FOR CROSSING R. IJSSEL AND CAPTURE OF APELDOORN

4. The GOC issued final orders at a conference held at div HQ on the morning of 10 Apr. Maj-Gen FOSTER's intention was - "1 Cdn Inf Div will est a brhead across the R. IJSSEL in area 9204-9201 and will adv and capture APELDOORN". Owing to the availability of a longer time for preparation and of a larger clear area, the assembly plan was altered. Originally, 1 Cdn Inf Bde and 3 Cdn Inf Bde were to move successively into the conc area vacated by 2 Cdn Inf Bde when the latter launched its attack. On 11 Apr however, prior to H hr, 1 Cdn Inf Bde gp moved into the area 9900-9901 behind 2 Cdn Inf Bde gp. Div HQ also moved fwd. 3 Cdn Inf Bde moved up to the conc area 9787-9786 vacated by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. Thus the bdes were more readily available.

5. The div went into action complete except for 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 PLDG) which was being reconverted from inf in the GHENT area. Tps under comd included 6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 H): 68 Med Regt RA: 4 RTR: HQ Flt, 652 AOP Sqn. Dots of SAS were to be dropped in conjunction with this op with a view to removing demolitions onbrs in the area of APELDROON and of seizing the airfield at TEUGE 8305. On the LEFT, 1 Cdn Corps was to cross the NEDER RIJN in the area. EAST of ARNHEM and to exploit with 5 Cdn Armd Div to link up with 1 Cdn Inf Div. On the RIGHT, 3 Cdn Inf Div was to simulate crossing of R. IJSSEL, NORTH of DEVENTER and SOUTH of SUTPHEN, conforming in time with 1 Cdn Inf Div crossings. Control of the EAST bk of the IJSSEL from excl DEVENTER to excl ZUTPHEN, was to be ensured by elts of 7 Cdn Recce Regt, placed under comd 1 Cdn Inf Div for the first phase of the op.

6. The op was to be carried out in four phases:

- (a) Phase 1 - 2 Cdn Inf Bde gp to make the assault crossing and est the brhead in the area 9204-9201.
- (b) Phase 2 - 1 Cdn Inf Bde gp to pass through brhead to area TWELLOO 8805. 2 Cdn Inf Bde on orders, to exploit SW to area 9000 outside the brhead, with one inf bn of 3 Cdn Inf Bde assuming responsibility for the protection of the immediate brhead area.
- (c) Phase 3 - 1 Cdn Inf Bde to continue adv to are TEUGE 8405, whereupon 3 Cdn Inf Bde was to pass through the brhead, adv SOUTH and WEST, and est the area 8501.
- (d) Phase 4 - 1 Cdn Inf Bde to continue adv to APELDOORN.



7. The arty plan was issued by CRA. Static smoke was to be laid on the flanks to provide a continuous haze over the br site during the hours of daylight, and arty smoke was to be provided in the brhead area, lifting to conform with the adv of the assaulting inf. Each bde had under comd one A. Tk bty. One tp lt AA was to protect the br site. The initial allotment of armour was: "A" Sqn, 6 Cdn Armd Regt under comd 2 Cdn Inf Bde the remainder of 6 Cdn Armd Regt under comd 1 Cdn Inf Bde. RCE were charged with constructing one Cl 9 FBE br and two Cl 40 rafts. For the assault crossing of 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 RTR were to provide LVTs ("Buffaloes") and operational personnel. The cab rank was made available on call and armed recce was to be provided over the area of ops. Medium bombers to engage known enemy arty areas from H hr.

8. At 0930 hrs 11 Apr, H hr was confirmed as 1630 hrs 11 Apr.

#### THE ASSAULT CROSSING OF R. IJSSEL AND EST OF BRHEAD

9. The op began as planned and by 1630 hrs 11 Apr, PPCLI RIGHT and SEAFORTH of C LEFT were crossing their SLs. By 1638 hrs both bns had begun to cross the river at the southern end of the GORSSEL bulge, area 940020. Though the smoke was working well some enemy fire came from the area of WILP. Fifteen minutes after H hr, two tps of the LEFT sqn of 4 RTR had touched down and vehs were moving fwd for ferry service.

10. By 1800 hrs both PPCLI and SEAFORTH of C had their rifle coys across to the initial objective and were beginning to exploit fwd. Opposn was light and PW were being taken in satisfactory numbers. Enemy shelling and mortar fire, particularly over the br site, increased; because of this the sappers were having difficulty in bringing bridging eqpt to the site. By 2115 hrs they reported that the FBE br at 943024 to be 50% complete, one close support raft in, and work started on a Cl 40 raft. Meanwhile, 1 Fd Coy had suffered 7 OR cas, 3 Fd Coy 1 offr and 3 OR cas, and 4 Fd Coy 1 OR cas. Enemy shelling was now easing off again.

11. By 2400 hrs the two bns were firm  $1\frac{1}{2}$  km WEST of the river, had taken 122 PW and knocked out one tk and one A/tk gun. The Cl 9 FBE br was open to traffic at 2315 hrs. The first tk landed at 0300 hrs and two close support rafts at 943024 were in op for engineer stores an hour later open to Cl 40 traffic.

12. During the night the enemy attempted some abortive counter attacks as the bns continued to press fwd. Between 0400 and 0500 hrs 12 Apr, PPCLI met with considerable opposn from inf, tks, and arty at WILP 9103. These attacks were beaten down and the opposn overcome by daylight. The remainder of the bde crossed, incl its F ech and at 0530 hrs the bns of 1 Cdn Inf Bde started to cross. By 0830 hrs, 23 tks and 2 smoke vehs were over. By 0900 hrs the brhead was considered firmly est and 1 Cdn Inf Bde was prepared to kick off on Phase 2. At 1015 hrs, when Phase 2 began, there were 35 tks across the river.

#### THE ADVANCE TO APELDOORN CANAL

13. 1 Cdn Inf Bde moved out of the brhead at 1015 hrs 12 Apr, passing through PPCLI, with 48 HIGHRS leading, followed by RCR and HAST & PER. By noon the leading elts of 48 HIGHRS had adv 5 km from the crossing place. RCR were following closely behind and HAST & PER, in res, were completely across the river.

CARLT & YORK R were ordered fwd, under command of 2 Cdn Inf Bde for the immediate protection of the brhead, so as to fill the gap created when PPCLI and SEAFORTH of C fanned out SW. They started to cross at 1400 hrs, but were delayed until SEAFORTH of C, using "Wasps", cleared up the estate at 913027. By 1700 hrs they were in posn, having relieved SEAFORTH of C and PPCLI coys in the area 9103. L EDMN R meanwhile, passed through SEAFORTH of C, moving SOUTH with tks down the river rd to 922002. By 1830 hrs two fd regt (1 Div Arty) were across the river and the third was in the process of crossing. At that time 3 Cdn Inf Bde were ordered to move into the brhead, beginning at 2359 hrs. At 2400 hrs, 1 Cdn Inf Bde, adv through fairly close country against moderate opposn and scattered arty and mortar fire, had pushed beyond TWELLOO 886058, the bde objective of Phase 2. 48 HIGHRS on the RIGHT were across the rly track NORTH of TWELLOO and RCR on the LEFT were just SOUTH of the rly (area 8504). HAST & PER in res, were conc in the area of HCVEN 9106. 2 Cdn Inf Bde brhead had been re-organized; PPCLI had shifted slightly NE and L EDMN R had adv SOUTH beyond the bend of the river to 00 Northing. 2 Cdn Inf Bde had taken approximately 535 PW to date. On the LEFT of the div and to the SOUTH, 49 (WR) Inf Div, had begun to cross the R IJSSEL immediately EAST of ARNHEM.

14. At 0600 hrs 13 Apr, the div came under comd 1 Cdn Corps. 1 Cdn Inf Bde during the morning moved fwd again, against moderate resistance and some arty and mortar fire, with RIGHT, HAST & PER, and LEFT, RCR,; 48 HIGHRS remaining in the TWELLOO-HOVEN area to protect the flank. By noon, HAST & PER, who had passed through 48 HIGHRS at 0600 hrs, had leading elts in TEUGE 8405. Fwd tps of RCR were across the secondary canal in the area 846040 and with tks were advancing WEST. At 130600B hrs, "A" Sqn, 6 Cdn Armd Regt, under comd 2 Cdn Inf Bde were put under comd 3 Cdn Inf Bde, who by 0650 hrs were complete in the brhead. CARLT & YORK R had reverted to under comd 3 Cdn Inf Bde at 0230 hrs. 3 Cdn Inf Bde moved out of the brhead at 1050 hrs attacking with RIGHT, CARLT & YORK R LEFT, WEST NSR, at 1100 hrs, and advancing SE of RCR in a westerly direction against light opposn. At 130600B hrs, 2 Cdn Inf Bde attacked SW with L EDMN R and PPCLI whose objectives were APPEN 900997 and GIETEL 8900 respectively. These they secured by 0800 hrs and continued the adv SOUTH towards VOORST 9188 and the APPENSCH VELD 8899-8800 respectively. PPCLI occupied this wood against opposn and in the afternoon flushed out the area with "Wasps" and carrier-mounted MMGs of SASK LI. L EDMN R finding VOORST clear, patrolled extensively and continued on to the rly at 910968 which was strongly held. SEAFORTH of C, meanwhile, had moved SOUTH to occupy the area 922998. During the afternoon Main HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div moved across the IJSSEL to 925024, an area one mile WEST of the br site. 2 Cdn LAA Regt, took over from 48 HIGHRS, NORTH of the rly and of TWELLOO, to provide RIGHT flank protection. By midnight, 1 Cdn Inf Bde adv NORTH of the rly with HAST & PER RIGHT and RCR LEFT, were 1 km from the APELDOORN CANAL and RCR had patrols into the part of the town EAST of the canal. ST JOSEPH'S HOSP, 8204, was overrun and next day was handed over to SAS who had come up behind the assaulting inf, and had not been dropped ahead of the inf as originally planned. The hosp housed approximately 800 enemy wounded and some 44 Allied wounded. In the CENTRE, SE of 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 3 Cdn Inf Bde had adv against generally light resistance to within 4 km of the town. CARLT & YORK R were firming up on the GROOTE WETERING CANAL and WEST NSR were in the area 8401: 1,000 yds short of the woods 8302. 2 Cdn Inf Bde were moving SW, with PPCLI in the wooded area 8899 and SEAFORTH of C and L EDMN R compactly behind them.



15. The day 14 Apr was one of slow progress with 1 Cdn Inf Bde bucking the enemy along the canal at APELDOORN, 3 Cdn Inf Bde bucking him along the ZUTPHEN-APELDOORN rly slightly SE of APELDOORN, and 2 Cdn Inf Bde committed along the same rly WEST of ZUPHEN.

(a) 1 Cdn Inf Bde met heavier fire as they approached APELDOORN and the canal. At 0300 hrs, 14 Apr, a dashing attempt was made by tks of 6 Cdn Armd Regt with inf tps of RCR riding on the tks, to seize the main rd crossing over the canal itself. Rd blocks and bazooka fire parried the attempt. During the morning HAST & PER succeeded in getting a coy est on the canal at NOORD APELDOORN 798057. Arty and MMG fire as well as sniping harassed the bns all day. A two bn attack, RIGHT 48 HIGHRS, LEFT RCR, was launched at 2300 hrs with the object of closing up to the canal in the town. Progress was slow against arty and hy MMG fire from firmly held enemy posns in the houses.

(b) Fighting during the day on 3 Cdn Inf Bde front was relatively hy. R 22e R were ordered to pass through CARLT & YORK R at 0730 hrs to clear the woods in the area 8302. Progress was made during the morning against determined SA and tk fire; the attack was renewed in the afternoon and by midnight more than half of the woods was cleared. It was not until the early hrs of the morning of 15 Apr that the enemy's will to resist weakened; the job was then speedily ended. In the afternoon of 14 Apr, 3 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to clear the triangle 833011-804005-802027, i.e. SW of the rly to the APELDOORN CANAL. This task was assigned to WEST NSR. Depending on their success, the bde might be passed over the canal SOUTH of APELDOORN. WEST NSR had difficulty along the rly and remained virtually static until withdrawn. CARLT & YORK R were ordered to pass through WEST NSR and to push across the rly. They moved off at 2100 hrs, successfully attacking the embankment at 834012. By midnight one coy was across the rly and a second on the way.

(c) It had become the task of the div to supply one bn to clear the WEST bk of the R IJSSEL SOUTH of the brhead area and to provide protection for the building of a Cl 40 br at ZUTPHEN. This would necessitate the clearing of HOVEN 9394. The task was given to 2 Cdn Inf Bde, now in res. 2 Cdn Inf Bde delegated it to SEAFORTH of C with L EDMN R putting one coy SOUTH to the rly embarkment at 910968, on the RIGHT flank of the SEAFORTH of C. SEAFORTH of C were ordered to start at 0600 hrs 14 Apr. The first coy moved off at the appointed time and reached 934962 after which the enemy were aroused and the job became hy. The L EDMN R coy moving along the rd from VOORST 9098, ran into hy fire. The enemy were numerous and strategically positioned in a trench system running WEST from the river. A second and then a third SEAFORTH of C coy were put in. Finally, under the determined pressure of both L EDMN R and SEAFORTH of C, and by the effective use of "wasps", the enemy broke. By midnight L EDMN R had crossed the rly and were in posn to cover the rd and rly brs 908968, which were taken intact, and SEAFORTH of C had a coy in HOVEN at 935947. The engineers began to build their br.

(d) On the flanks, 11 Cdn Inf Bde was controlling the EAST bk of R. IJSSEL from ZUTPHEN to the area of ARNHEM except for GIESBEEK 8378 and DOESBURG 9080 which were still in enemy hands; 49 (WR) Inf Div were fighting in ARNHEM and

spreading out NW of the town. 5 Cdn Armd Bde was teeing up for an attack on the LEFT of 1 Cdn Inf Div with the intention of adv on the axis ARNHEM-OTTERLOO 8591-BARNEVELD 5295-NIJKERK 4605, and exploiting to the ZUIDER ZEE (IJSSSELMEER)

16. During the night 14/15 Apr, SEAFORTH of C lost contact with the enemy who were now attempting to pull out. The 1 Cdn Inf Bde attack to secure crossings over the APELDOORN CANAL in APELDOORN was stalemated in the town; fwd coys were pinned down by arty, mortar, and MMG fire from across the canal. Valiant efforts were made by 6 Cdn Armd Regt but the approaches were studded by mines and rd blocks covered by A.TK Fire. Five tks bogged down. On the morning 15 Apr, a demand was put in for "crocodiles", to be used to flush out enemy posns in cellars of the bldgs on the WEST bk of the canal. These were not immediately available. The div was notified of a change of bdy, and a consequent modification of the div plan was made, to coordinate the action with that of 49 (WR) Div. On bde from 49 (WR) Div at ARNHEM was to clear the rd NORTH from ARNHEM to DIEREN 8784, and while 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes continued WEST to APELDOORN, 2 Cdn Inf Bde was to clear the rd along the IJSSSEL from ZUTPHEN to DIEREN, contacting 49 (WR) Div. This task undertaken by PPCLI and L EDMN R, proved, by mid-afternoon, to be a pursuit job. During the afternoon and evening of 15 Apr, 3 Cdn Inf Bde began closing up to the canal SOUTH of the rly and 2 Cdn Inf Bde was involved in a chase SW along the line of rd and rly ZUTPHEN-ARNHEM, L EDMN R having reached, by 1550 hrs, BRUMMEN 916888, against lt opposn, with PPCLI following up on secondary rds to the WEST. By midnight 15 Apr, the posns were: RIGHT, 1 Cdn Inf Bde - 48 HIGHRS coys on the northern outskirts of APELDOORN with posts on the canal, RCR coys in the town with pls facing up to the canal, HAST & PER behind 48 HIGHRS mopping up: CENTRE, 3 Cdn Inf Bde - CARLT & YORK R facing up to the canal, likewise R 22e R on their LEFT, down to 98 Northing: 2 Cdn Inf Bde - LEFT and SE, controlling a wide area 3-6 km WEST of R IJSSSEL and patrolling to the canal with NORTH to SOUTH - SEAFORTH of C., PPCLI and L EDMN R. Up to 1800 hrs 15 Apr, after four days of action, the PW who passed through the Div PW Cage were: 25 offrs and 1,743 ORs. In addition there were 131 evacuated through med channels and 800 taken in ST JOSEPH'S HOSP. 12 Cdn Armd Regt (TRR) came under comd of the div to relieve 6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 H). The situation on the LEFT of the div was developing. ARNHEM had been cleared by 49 (WR) Div. 5 Cdn Armd Bde had attacked in the early morning of 15 Apr, passing through 49 (WR) Div at ARNHEM. 9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD) had reached a point 10 km NORTH of ARNHEM, along the main rd to APELDOORN and other units of 5 Cdn Armd Bde had made similar progress on their LEFT.

#### THE CROSSING OF THE APELDOORN CANAL AND THE CAPTURE OF APELDOORN

17. The intention for 16 Apr was: 1 Cdn Inf Bde to firm up to the canal and recce for crossing places; 3 Cdn Inf Bde to firm up to the canal from APELDOORN to 4 km SOUTH (811983). The crossing was to be made by either bde, which would then clear the rest of APELDOORN. 2 Cdn Inf Bde to move NW to link with 3 Cdn Inf Bde and to patrol WEST and SE of the canal and to contact 49 (WR) Div. "Crocodiles" of B sqn, 141 RAC (79 Armd Div) were on their way up to 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes. (Two tps to each bde.) At first light 16 Apr, 146 Bde (49 (WR) Div) moved NORTH from ARNHEM against no opposn. DIEREN was reported clear, so elts of L EDMN R entered the town. At 1200 hrs the GOC ordered 2 Cdn Inf Bde to put L EDMN R across the canal at DIEREN and to move up the WEST side of it to a brhead posn in the area WEST of VELDHUISEN 8294, to cover the bldg of a Cl



40 br at 839950. 3 Fd Coy, R.C.E., put in a Cl 40 br at DIEREN and L EDMN R moved speedily against no resistance. By 1500 hrs L EDMN R Tac HQ was set up at rd jct 839950 across the canal and the bn had moved up by lorry, debussed, and crossed without waiting for the br. By late afternoon the br at 839950 was complete and considerable bde traffic was crossing it. By 2000 hrs both L EDMN R and PPCLI were across the river and SEAFORTH of C were on the move. Meanwhile, 2 Cdn Armd Regt (LdSH) of 5 Cdn Armd Div had bypassed BARNEVELD 5295, and were moving up to NIJKERK 4605, and 9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD) were firm in the town of VOORTHUIZEN 5401, thus cutting the main APELDOORN-AMERSFOORT rd. The swift movement of 5 Cdn Armd Bde and the success of 2 Cdn Inf Bde crossing the APELDOORN CANAL prompted a change in plan. The 1 Cdn Inf Bde attack on APELDOORN was cancelled, WEST NSR were put on two hours notice to pass through the 2 Cdn Inf Bde brhead and directed on APELDOORN from the SOUTH, R 22e R were on call to follow WEST NSR. The threat to his rear seemed likewise to prompt the enemy cmd of the APELDOORN garrison to change his plans, for, although up to 1800 hrs 16 Apr, it was believed that the enemy force in APELDOORN was going to continue its stubborn resistance, by midnight it was apparent to the tps of 1 Cdn Inf Bde that the enemy was withdrawing.

18. The intention for 1 Cdn Inf Bde to remain firm in its present posn facing the APELDOORN CANAL and 2 Cdn Inf Bde to provide a firm base 8394 to 7696 for a 3 Cdn Inf Bde attack on APELDOORN from the SOUTH with WEST NSR leading, R 22e R following up and CARLT & YORK R remaining in its present posn on the EAST side of the canal. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, however, took advantage of the slackened enemy resistance. Before daylight RCR had patrols across the canal and by 0600 hrs had two coys across and in the centre of the town. WEST NSR coming up from the SOUTH, were now moving rapidly and by 0800 hrs were nearing the outskirts of APELDOORN. R 22e R were ordered to cross directly from their present locn at 805997 and WEST NSR to shift WEST of the main ARNHEM-APELDOORN rd so that the two bns would adv on the city on parallel lines on each side of the highway. By this time a br (SEG) had been put across the canal in APELDOORN and RCR coys were completely across and occupying the town against no opposn. By 0930 hrs WEST NSR had cleared the southern approaches to the city, 48 HIGHRS were on their way through to the NW end of it and HAST & PER were moving to the ROYAL PALACE and grounds 777056. At this time two floating brs were in op at the lock 795041, the lock having been taken intact. A Cl 40 br at 793036 was already begun and completed at 1100 hrs. There was wild rejoicing in APELDOORN, the civs being almost hysterical with relief, partly because the city was entered without the kind of fighting which would have destroyed it. National colours of the NETHERLANDS were flying in the brilliant sunl ght from almost every house and shop. Among those liberated were some Brit tps from the Airborne Div which had been dropped at ARNHEM in Sep 44, and a few escaped Allied PW, who had been given sanctuary by the Dutch Underground.

#### THE PURSUIT WEST FROM APELDOORN

19. The chase and clearing up were immediately entered into. The method was quick pursuit by mobile patrols followed by inf on foot or embussed to mop up and to clear the woods. RCR provided a firm base in the town and HAST & PER spread out along the APELDOORN-AMERSFOORT rd, some of the inf being carried on tks. The intention was for HAST & PER to go as far as NIEUWMILLIGEN 6604, when 48 HIGHRS, brought up on lorries,



would pass through. WEST NSR moved WEST and SOUTH of the town against little opposn and regrouped into mobile adv gps on the axis of the secondary rd running more or less parallel with the rly. They met local opposn in the area 767001 which they overcame. R 22e R began to move at 1300 hrs. This deliberate mopping up was in progress, when, before noon, the div was ordered to push WEST as quickly as possible as far as a line VOORTHUIZEN 5401 - BARNEVELD 5295, so as to join with 5 Cdn Armd Div units already in the area, and to relieve them. A div plan coordinated the adv WEST on three axes - 1 Cdn Inf Bde at the NORTH along the main APELDOORN-AMERSFOORT rd, 3 Cdn Inf Bde in the CENTRE, SOUTH of the APELDOORN-AMERSFOORT rly, 2 Cdn Inf Bde to the SOUTH, clearing to approximately 93 Northing. The country was very close, particularly in 1 Cdn Inf Bde axis in the NORTH. The main rd cut straight through a great wooded area where enemy could hide out in large numbers. Farther SOUTH, the country was more pastoral, dotted with small woods, farm bldgs, and ditches. The enemy seemed to have organized no plan of withdrawal, and whether or not he realized it, there was no haven to which he could withdraw since his escape routes were cut both to AMERSFOORT and to the NE. Some gps moved towards EEM and OTTERLOO where they bumped tps of 5 Cdn Armd Div, others were reported to have attempted a very minor DUNKIRK from the area of ELBURG 7029, on the ZUIDER ZEE. R 22e R after 1200 hrs started to move on an axis LEFT of the WEST NSR, with CARLT & YORK following them. At 1600 hrs the bde comd halted the coln so as to recce the situation since a civ report had come in of tk conc in the wood 6197-6198-6297-6298, at the western end of the axis of adv. 2 Cdn Inf Bde adv with RIGHT, PPCLI, and LEFT, SEAFORTH of C, clearing out the area 7195-7194, was running into only slight opposn. When the enemy were bumped they surrendered. The intention, to conform with the altered div plan, was to pass L EDMN R, with a sqn less two tps of tks, a pl of MMGs and two SP guns through the fwd bns and to continue the adv to LEGERPLAATS 6393, 4 km WEST of OTTERLOO. PPCLI were then to move to the area 6395 whereupon L EDMN R would push on to the town of BARNEVELD. During the afternoon the chief opposn encountered by 1 Cdn Inf Bde were obstacles on the rd - large felled trees, with some few fanatics left behind to cover them with fire. They took 60-80 PW and killed some 70 others, good use being made of "crocodile" flame throwers to immobilize enemy in the wood on either side of the rd. HAST & PER met quite hy resistance from A.Tk guns and a few SP guns and inf (paratroopers) with bazookas in the area of NIEUWMILLIGEN which was reached by 1900 hrs. Stiff opposn was again encountered 1 km WEST when four 88 mm guns were taken and about 150 enemy killed. By 2400 hrs HAST & PER was in the area of the Cavalry Depot 6504 with fighting still going on; RCR, lifted in TCVs, were 2 km EAST and 48 HIGHRs, lifted part of the way in TCVs were behind them. 2 Cdn Inf Bde HQ was est 4 km EAST of BARNEVELD and SEAFORTH of C and L EDMN R (the latter being in contact with 11 Cdn Inf Bde) were in the BARNEVELD area. 3 Cdn Inf Bde HQ was est 4 km EAST of BARNEVELD at 561953 and WEST NSR and R 22e R were EAST of, and in BARNEVELD, R 22e R being in contact with C B Highrs. CARLT & YORK R were moving up behind WEST NSR. The div intention was for 1 Cdn Inf Bde to continue up to VOORTHUIZEN, 3 Cdn Inf Bde to conc in the area of BARNEVELD and 2 Cdn Inf Bde to conc in the area EAST of BARNEVELD. Div HQ had moved during the day to an area immediately EAST of APELDOORN, 825035. A new bdy was est between 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div running along approximately 94 Northing and incl BARNEVELD in 1 Cdn Inf Div area, though in fact that evening there was considerable intermingling of tps of both divs. It had been a hard day's march for most of the inf, because while attempts were made to

lift as many as possible on TCVs, the majority had to go on foot and clear out as they went. The inf of 2 Cdn Inf Bde for instance, covered more than 35 km in the 24 hrs. The PW bag was satisfactorily large: 12 offr and 458 ORs passed through the PW cage from 1800 hrs 16 Apr to 2200 hrs 17 Apr, making a total since the beginning of the op of - 40 offr and 2,513 ORs.

20. Chief work for 18 Apr was to clean up the area passed through and to relieve 5 Cdn Armd Div. 1 Cdn Inf Div was to take over comd of 5 Cdn Armd Div sector when units of the latter were relieved by units of this div. Fwd elts of 5 Cdn Armd Div were at 568050, NORTH of NIJKERK, and at PUTTEN 549090, with other units in the BARNEVELD area and WEST to 495989. A new inter-div bdy was set up upon the completion of the relief of 5 Cdn Armd Div, between 49 (WR) Div and 1 Cdn Inf Div, which gave the latter the area NORTH of OTTERLOO and incl BARNEVELD. 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 PLDG) were due in the area on 20 Apr coming from GHENT where they had been re-equipping as a recce regt. HAST & PER moved off along the main axis, out of contact with the enemy. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to send a bn to VOORTHUIZEN to relieve elts of 5 Cdn Armd Div in that area. In the afternoon enemy tps were reported here and there and investigated with help of the local Dutch resistance. Enemy were reported in the PRINS HENDRIK BOSCH 6198-6001-6397, in 1 Cdn Inf Bde area. A PPCLI patrol went out to find 100 enemy reported in the area ACRTERVELD 4695; no enemy were seen. En route they picked up 3 PW and 5 Russians in civ clothes. 3 Cdn Inf Bde took up posns astride 5 Cdn Armd Div axis of adv and assumed responsibility to incl lateral rd at 556112 on the rd to ERMEL 5613 - PUTTEN 5409. WEST NSR took over the area of PUTTEN, R 22e R were astride the same rd, area HUINEN 5406 between PUTTEN and VOORTHUIZEN. CARLT & YORK R moved to area KRUISHAAR 5002. Civs reported some 100 enemy had withdrawn from this area to the area DRIEDORP 483033 where they were said to be organizing def posns. Prisoners were being rounded up by everybody. 9 Cdn Lt Fd Amb collected approximately 50. Civs reported 60 enemy in area 565022, 2 km SE of VOORTHUIZEN, who would not surrender to a 4 Fd Amb DR. The BM of 3 Cdn Inf Bde went out with a couple of def pl men to pick them up. 2 Cdn Inf Bde units completed the take over from 5 Cdn Armd Div and were positioned as follows:- L EDMN R astride the rd jct between BARNEVELD and NIJKERK, and the main rd from APELDOORN-AMMERSFOORT, in area 5199; PPCLI in BARNEVELD and on its western outskirts. One patrol sent out to ACHTERVELD 4695 at 2300 hrs, took 9 more PW, SEAFORTH of C were in the area of the rd and rly jct NE of BARNEVELD with one coy in VOORTHUIZEN. 2 Cdn Lt AA Regt, was being used in a ground role in def posns along the rd from 785662 to 681109 and WEST to area 642102. Div HQ moved to area 592906, 7 km NE of BARNEVELD.

#### THE APPROACH TO R EEM AND STATIC WARFARE

21. By reason of higher authority a halt was called to the divisional adv and the op which began with the crossing of R IJSSEL came to a virtual end as our tps approached R EEM and the city of AMERSFOORT. During the next week the div settled down to clearing out any enemy who remained in the area from APELDOORN to ACHTERVELD, to sweeping the land bordering the ZUIDER ZEE from ELBURG to R EEM and to testing or removing outposts of the enemy's so-called "GREBBE LINE". When our tps had stopped short of the R EEM the enemy began to est new outposts or to reinforce old ones EAST of the river. His tps in this area were under comd of 6 Para Div and began to resist



actively in a manner to be expected from paratroopers.

22. On 19 Apr, vigorous and widespread patrolling was carried out. During the morning, carriers with "Wasps", MMGs, and Inf of 3 Cdn Inf Bde went as far WEST as ZWARTEBROEK 4799 and reported it clear. 2 Cdn Lt AA Regt, went on a splendid wood-clearing expedition with 400 Dutch Patriots, reach EPE-NUNSPEET 6721-HARDERNIJK 5519, covering many square miles in their drive, and took some 60 PW. This action anticipated a planned extensive sweep by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. Meanwhile, 49 Div Recce was scouring the area farther EAST up to the ZUIDER ZEE. A L EDMN R battle gp under Lt-Col STONE and incl a coy of inf, carriers with "Wasps", carrier-mounted MMGs, a tp of tks, a tp of SP guns, and a sec of 3" mortars, set off in the afternoon to the area 4300-4301-4302, going from TERSCHUUR 4898 WEST to HOEVELAKEN. The gp was finally stopped by two rd blocks in the area 437001, which were covered by SP and mortar fire. They partly demolished one. The patrol returned at 1700 hrs, reporting determined sniping, considerable SA and mortar fire and three active SP guns. 1 Cdn Inf Bde patrolled to the sea. CARLT & YORK reported DRIEDORP 483033 cleared. A R 22e R mobile battle patrol reach 470066 at 1830 hrs on its way to NIJKERK; the patrol was engaged when at the edge of the wood at the NE outskirts of the town by a strong enemy force, and tk movement was heard in the town. A WEST NSR task force moving to the ZUIDER ZEE, area 449088, due NORTH of NIJKERK, saw considerable gps of enemy engaged them with MG and arty fire.

23. During the morning of 20 Apr, CARLT & YORK R cleared NIJKERK and took some PW; a mobile force patrolled to R EEM. A CARLT & YORK R battle gp left the area of NIJKERK at 1030 hrs and by 1600 hrs reported having cleared ten villages and searched out side-roads using independent secs, from the area NORTH of the rly up to the R EEM (4202-3502). At HAM 3800, which they did not entirely clear, they were fired on by MGs and bazookas. At ZEVENHUIZEN 3963, they contacted a WEST NSR patrol. Civs reported most of the brs over the canal were blown excepting these in the area of AMERSFOORT. A R 22e R patrol in the evening to rd and rly jct 410005, 1½ km NORTH of the canal at AMERSFOORT, was attacked by approximately 50 enemy. R 22e R suffered two lt cas and two "Wasps" were put out of action; enemy cas were four killed and several wounded. PW who passed through the div cage from the beginning of Op CANNONSHOT, up to 2000 hrs 20 Apr, numbered - 46 offrs and 3,778 ORs. Posns at 2400 hrs were: 3 Cdn Inf Bde - WEST NSR blocking in the wooded area 4706, with four coys surrounding it; CARLT & YORK R SOUTH and EAST of NIJKERK cutting the NIJKERK-AMERSFOORT rd, area 4504; R 22e R, replacing CARLT & YORK R, 5 km WEST of VOORTHUIZEN 5401 and cutting the rd from 496 to 530022. 2 Cdn Inf Bde - centred on BARNVELD with continued westward pressure. 1 Cdn Inf Bde in res in the area GARDEREN 6205 - OUD MILLIGEN 6304, and SW.

24. Civs reported that resistance forces held SPAKENBURG 3906 on the ZUIDER ZEE, so a WEST NSR patrol was sent there. 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 PLDG) had now arrived in the area and sqns took over posns at HARDERWIJK 5519, NUNSPEET 6721, and ELBURG 7029, and patrolled along the coast EAST to KAMPEN. Some 220 Dutch Partisans, uniformed chiefly in blue denims, and forming two coys of 110 all ranks, were brought up and came under comd of the div, for use on patrols, in holding roles, or, if required, in attack. One coy was put under comd of 3 Cdn Inf Bde and one coy under comd of 2 Cdn Inf Bde.

25. PPCLI, who had had a coy in ACHTERVELD 4695, during the night 21/22 Apr, kept it there as a permanent holding force. The wood in 3 Cdn Inf Bde area, 4300-4302, was still not clear and action was taken to flush it out. One R 22e R coy went to BUNSCHOTEN 385074 and SPAKENBURG 391089. The area from R EEM to 4 km EAST of BUNSCHOTEN and from the sea to 2 km SOUTH of the town had been flooded by the enemy. The rd into BUNSCHOTEN however, was dry.

26. Clearing of the wooded area 4300 continued on 23 Apr, with R 22e R making good progress on the job. The units of 2 Cdn Inf Bde moved fwd one km towards R EEM against lt opposn. They reported a small flooded area EAST of the river and ahead of SEAFORTH of C FDLs. Evidence that there were enemy still hiding in the woods was a raid made by 30 of them into APELDOORN on the evening of 23 Apr to secure food.

27. On 24 Apr, 2 Cdn Inf Bde continued its westward pressure towards AMERSFOORT, but with no intention of entering the town. A R 22e R attack to clear the enemy from the rd jct 427997, using AVRES, was launched during the afternoon. Enemy in the area of HAM 385007, in 3 Cdn Inf Bde sector continued to offer stiff resistance to the attacking CARLT & YORK R, who also ran into SCHU mines sown indiscriminately. Both bns were ultimately successful and the bde PW bag for the day was 124.

28. An enemy attack on LEICS of 49 (WR) Div in the early morning of 25 Apr was accompanied by shelling of PPCLI posns in the ACHTERVELD area. Enemy outposts across the div sector continued to resist in a determined fashion and our patrols suffered cas from mortar and arty fire at close range, as well as from grenades and snipers. At midnight instrs were issued through the CRA of this HQ, that guns were not to be fired except DF in case of attack. Earlier in the day, sigs of the div had picked up a wireless message from the C-in-C enemy forces in Western HOLLAND, for transmission to the C-in-C Brit forces, regarding the dropping of food sups by Brit to civs in enemy occupied Western HOLLAND.

29. The period from 26 to 28 Apr was very quiet except for an attack made on the evening of 27 Apr by a gp of about 40 enemy who infiltrated into a R 22e R coy posn. They were driven out by tk and arty fire; no cas were suffered by our own tps. On 28 Apr, 2 Cdn Inf Bde temporarily re-organized some def posns in preparation for an important conference being held that day in PPCLI area. A temporary truce was declared effective throughout the day, and that evening the truce was continued by order of higher authority. The only cas of the day was a WEST NSR soldier who was killed by an enemy sniper who had apparently not heard of the truce.

#### THE WAR'S END

30. The conference held at the schoolhouse in ACHTERVELD 4695, on 28 Apr, had for its ostensible purpose the discussion of supplying Allied food to starving Dutch civs in German-occupied Western HOLLAND. Arrangements for the conference were made by wireless communication between 21 Army Gp and the German Reich Commissioner in Western HOLLAND (SEYSS INQUART), through 1 Cdn Inf Div sigs. The conference was attended by senior offrs of both 21 Army Gp and 25 German Army, and by Dutch civs food administrator from THE HAGUE. Brig M.P. BOGART, DSO, comd of 2 Cdn Inf Bde, his BM, Major A.G. McGEE, together with the div IO, Lieut G. KORANSKY, to act as interpreter, met the German party in the German lines and escorted them to ACHTERVELD. A second and larger conference was held on



30 Apr in the same place when arrangements were completed to run food sups in by the WAGENINGEN-RHENEN rd, in 49 (WR) Div area, in Cdn Army vehs.

31. While these negotiations were taking place the truce continued. On 1 May, the enemy announced his intention of discontinuing the truce in the area NORTH of the rly EDE-UTRECHT, but continuing it SOUTH of that line to the RHINE, i.e. in 49 (WR) Div area. Nevertheless, the non-offensive-section instr applying to 1 Cdn Inf Div was reaffirmed on orders from our own higher authority, though it was made clear to our tps that they were to snipe at any enemy they saw, and to use DF and CB fire if the enemy acted offensively. On the afternoon of 1 May, WEST NSR were mortared by the enemy and counter mortar fire was used in retaliation. Main HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div moved on 3 May to Z559014, near VOORTHUIZEN. On 3 May, the enemy notified his intentions of resuming the offensive as of 040800B hrs. This div continued to refrain from offensive action, but the units of 1 Cdn Inf Bde were put on notice to move fwd to an area closer to the front. The enemy did not, however, take any offensive action.

32. While all had been quiet on 1 Cdn Corps sector since 28 Apr, hy fighting had been going on, on the RIGHT sector of the Cdn Army, along the NORTH SEA. The situation in GERMANY itself had become desperate for the Wehrmacht, BERLIN was completely occupied by the Russians on 2 May. Rumours of peace were emanating from American civ sources, but it was not impossible that, whatever the situation in GERMANY, a WEST HOLLAND battle might have to be fought against an estimated 120,000 Germans in that area. At 2100 hrs 4 May, a BBC news broadcast was heard which gave this HQ the infm that the German Chief-of-State - Admiral DOENITZ - had unconditionally surrendered to Field Marshal MONTGOMERY, all German or German-controlled forces in NW GERMANY, HOLLAND, and DENMARK. The surrender was to take effect at 030800B hrs. At 2200 hrs the following message was received from HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, from HQ 1 Cdn Corps: "ALL OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL CEASE FORTHWITH. NO FIRING OF ANY TYPE OF WEAPON WILL TAKE PLACE FROM 050800B HRS." Shortly afterwards, orders were issued that all tps would stand fast.

33. Bdes were cautioned against allowing promiscuous firing in their areas. Fwd pls did not indulge in any such firing, but in some rear areas a few rds of tracer and a few flares marked the eve of peace. Some enemy across from 3 Cdn Inf Bde were reported to be celebrating. A small enemy patrol during the night 4/5 May, came in on a WEST NSR posn. the patrol opened fire and their fire was returned. There were no cas. This was the last reported firing on the div front. The negotiations for the surrender were at Corps level. An initial meeting with German staff offrs was held at 1100 hrs 5 May, in WAGENINGEN 5776. At 1600 hrs, also at WAGENINGEN, the Corps Comd, Lt-Gen FOULKES, with his staff offrs, and in the presence of Prince BERNHARDT, met the German 25 Army Comd, Col-Gen BLASKOWITZ, with some of his staff offrs, and dictated the terms of surrender.

34. Final posns were: RIGHT, 3 Cdn Inf Bde with under comd one coy of Dutch Nationals, NORTH of the APELDOORN-AMERS-FOORT rly, in visual control of R EEM or positioned up to the flooded areas in the NORTH. LEFT, 2 Cdn Inf Bde with under comd one coy of Dutch Nationals, controlling the area SOUTH of the rly to the bdy with 49 (WR) Inf Div, along 923 Northing, being thus 3 km EAST of AMERSFOORT and 2 km EAST of the MODDER, tributary to the R EEM. 1 Cdn Inf Bde was in res, 15 km WEST and NORTH of APELDOORN. Controlling the coastal area bordering

the ZUIDER ZEE were widely scattered sqns of 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4PLDC) assisted by Dutch Nationals. The div stood fast until 8 May when it moved into Western HOLLAND to conc and disarm 30 German Corps and other German forces in a wide area extending from the R RHINE in the SOUTH to DEN HELDER Z0089 in the NORTH and incl the cities of AMSTERDAM, ROTTERDAM, THE HAGUE, and HAARLEM.

#### GENERAL COMMENT

35. The first op which 1 Cdn Inf Div was engaged in NW EUROPE and which came to a virtual close on 18 Apr, and to a complete standstill opposite R EEM and AMERSFOORT on 28 Apr, when the temporary truce was entered upon, justified the good reputation which the Div had earned for itself in ITALY. The div had liberated approximately 330 sq miles of HOLLAND and taken PW the following: 51 offr, 4,259 ORs and 35 civs, through the PW cage; 165 through med channels and 876 in overrun hosps (correct figures to 28 Apr). At the end of the action the tps were in fine fighting fettle and anxious to get on with the job. Cas had been lt - a total from the beginning of the action to the end of the month of 11 offr and 97 ORs killed, 26 offr and 456 ORs wounded, 9 ORs missing, making a total of 37 offr and 562 OR cas. These figures are interesting, first because of the unusually high percentage killed to wounded - one out of every five being a fatal cas. (In previous like actions the ratio had never been higher than one to ten.) Secondly, because of the high percentage of offr cas. Thirdly, because the number missing was the smallest it had ever been for a similar period of ops. During the crossing of R IJSEL and the est of the brhead on 11 Apr and night 11/12, PPCLI and SEAFORTH of C, who carried out the op, suffered only three killed and forty-three wounded. The heaviest day's cas occurred on 13 Apr, when there were twelve killed and 87 wounded, ten of the killed and 54 of the wounded being suffered by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. By morning of 19 Apr, when the main adv had ended, the total cas were: 1 Cdn Inf Bde - 33 killed, 121 wounded; 2 Cdn Inf Bde - 29 killed, 153 wounded; 3 Cdn Inf Bde 25 killed, 87 wounded. None of the bdes had any men reported missing. Incl cas in unbridged units of the div, the total at that time was: 9 offr and 81 ORs killed, 18 offr and 372 ORs wounded, 2 ORs missing.

#### 2. THE SURRENDER ARRANGEMENTS (5 MAY - 8 JUN 45) FROM THE DIVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE POINT OF VIEW (FROM NOTES OF AN INTERVIEW WITH G.S.O. III INT, BY HIST OFFR 1 CDN INF DIV).

1. The surrender terms were dictated by Comd 1 Cdn Corps to the Comd 25 German Army at WAGENINGEN on the afternoon of 5 May. German offr present were: Col-Gen BLASKOWITZ, Comd 25 German Army; Lt-Gen REICHEL, his Chief-of-Staff; the German A&Q; some German staff offr and interpreters. Cdn Offr taking part were: Lt-Gen FOULKES; Brig KITCHING, Chief-of-Staff; Brig GILBRIDE, DA&QMG; Maj KINGSMILL, GSO II, Int, 1 Cdn Corps; Lt-Col CHATER, GSO I, Int, First Cdn Army; Capt MOLNAR, GSO III, Int, 1 Cdn Inf Div, who acted as the Corps Comd interpreter. Also present was Prince BERNHARDT. This surrender meeting was preceded in the morning by a preliminary conference between the German Chief-of-Staff and Lt-Gen FOULKES.

2. From the day following the WAGENINGEN conference, Capt MOLNAR acted as the GOC's interpreter and staff offr - in the latter capacity because, when Gen FOSTER went to a meeting with the German Corps Comd, he took no other offr but Capt MOLNAR with him. The Germans on the other hand would appear as a complete party - the Comd 30 German Corps (Gen



KLEFFEL) would have with him his Chief-of-Staff, his A&Q, etc. After the first meeting with Gen KLEFFEL, Capt MOLNAR did the translating for both sides. At the first meeting the German Corps Comd had a capt interpreter, who was not too proficient; the next day he had a good interpreter, but this man was only a cpl.

3. In order to make definite and to facilitate certain arrangements, Gen FOSTER wrote several letters to Gen KLEFFEL. These were translated into German (at the request of Gen FOSTER) and it was the German version which was delivered. The Germans caught on to this idea, added a translating and interpreting section to their staff, and from that time on, all the letters and messages which they sent to the div were in English. This did not make for added accuracy but certainly did speed things up. Wherever possible, messages were passed by telephone. From the first day there was direct telephone line between HQ 30 German Corps and HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div. (HQ 30 German Corps was a series of houses to the LEFT of the main rd leading to THE HAGUE, in the ROTTERDAM suburb of OVERSCHIE.)

4. The surrender arrangements were effected in the following manner. The Com 30 German Corps received his orders from Gen FOSTER in much the same manner that one of our own bde comd received his orders, since 30 German Corps was in fact under comd 1 Cdn Inf Div. Int department was augmented by a documents team (two NCO translators) and an interpreters pool (civs who were proficient in both German and Dutch). The Germans were ordered to do the work of conc and later of marching their tps out of Western HOLLAND, themselves. This div was responsible for approving their plans and then for seeing that the Germans carried them out. Therefore, our bns and bdes were not expected to issue orders to the Germans or to interfere with the German plans. The job of local commanders was to provide guards and escorts and to see that the local German comd carried out the orders he had received from his superior offr. It would have been quite impossible otherwise for this div to handle the job of surrender since 30 German Corps had under its comd approximately 72,000 personnel. 30 German Corps had really an army status; it was designated ARMEE ABTEILUNG - "Army Dept". Each of the 30 Corps divs was put under the supervision of one of our bde gps:

Coastal Def Sector, NORTH (11th Naval Div) under comd AGRA  
Coastal Def Sector, SOUTH (20 Para Div) under comd 2 Cdn  
Inf Bde.

533 Rear Area Comd under comd 3 Cdn Inf Bde  
Corps Gp DIESTEL(with a couple of div elts in it) under  
comd RCA Gp

5. The actual German naval elts, i.e. naval afloat, naval arty and naval coastal installations, were under comd of the German Admiral of the NETHERLANDS. This German Admiral, and consequently the gps under him, were put under comd of the Brit FO HOLLAND. Difficulties of communication and liaison arose because FO HOLLAND was not under 1 Cdn Inf Div but was working with HQ 1 Cdn Corps. On the other hand, Comd 30 German Corps received his orders from Comd 1 Cdn Inf Div.

6. The GSO III, in addition to acting as interpreter, visited HQ 30 German Corps every second or third day to liaise directly with the Chief-of-Staff. When the German move out of Western HOLLAND reached the planning stage, the German Corps Comd deemed it necessary to have meetings with his div comd and staff. Two large conferences were held and were attended by all

the senior comd of 30 German Corps and their staffs. Gen FOSTER, in permitting these conferences, stipulated that a Cdn offr be present. Therefore, Capt MOLNAR attended these conferences, in company with a clerk, as a sort of censor.

7. "Gen FOSTER and Cdn Staff offr dealing with the Germans treated them and their problems with a certain amount of consideration and understanding so as to assist them in getting their job done - which was to get out of Western HOLLAND as expeditiously as possible. The Germans reciprocated and at our level there was no hitch or no trouble of any sort. Actually, the Germans went to the extent of "showing off", in their speed and the literal accuracy with which they carried out our orders. At bde level the only hitches occurred when the bde did not trust the Germans to carry out their job, as for instance, in AMSTERDAM when SEAFORTH of C made a preliminary conc in that city, which was not according to the approved German plan. On the whole, the arrangements for the conc and despatch out of HOLLAND worked very smoothly indeed. This is due in great measure to the sensible appreciation of the average Cdn soldier and to his good discipline whereby the German soldier was treated neither gently nor brutally but with strict justice. The bearing of the ordinary Cdn soldier was highly appreciated by the German staffs."

8. All the Germans who deserted after the armistice were turned over to their respective units for disciplining. Germans who deserted some time ago, but were picked up after the armistice, were sent to the Corps PW Cage and passed back through the usual channels. A German who had deserted many months ago, who had got into civ clothes and had done good work for the Dutch Underground must still be treated as a PW. The Dutch Underground may have given this man some promise of immunity in return for the work done by him though he must still go to the Corps PW Cage. The Dutch Underground have been advised to give such a man a signed sealed letter stating the duration of his work with the underground and the kind of service he has given them. This letter the PW may take with him.

9. The areas originally designed as conc areas - in a div plan made between 5-7 May - were uninhabited places, which would give no cover to the Germans. When it was realized that the Germans stay in these conc areas would be of several weeks' duration, the areas were changed to those actually used for the conc. Most of these areas had buildings which the Germans had previously occupied.

10. The div has had to handle approximately 72,000 Germans. As of 8 Jun there are only 4,000 left to be despatched from Western HOLLAND. In addition there are some 8,000 German engineers (with staffs) and naval personnel who are remaining to finish the required work of mine lifting, demolition of rd blocks, etc. The route of march for most of 88 German Corps has been through 1 Cdn Inf Div staging areas. The div has had no responsibility for them, except from IJMUIDEN to the despatch area at DEN HEIDER.



