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Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda (Series 6 and 7).

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M. P. Johnston
(M.P. Johnston),
Lt-Col., G.S.,
for Chief of the General Staff.

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

15 Sept 44

CANADIAN OPERATIONS - NORTH-WEST EUROPE

Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda (Series 6)

1. Further to my 24/AEF/1 (Hist), dated 5 Sept 44, attached are additional extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda dealing with Canadian Operations in North-West Europe.
2. These Extracts are circulated for general information only, and opinions stated are not to be considered as necessarily expressions of official doctrine.

(K. Stuart) Lieut-General,
Chief of Staff,
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPEJULY - AUGUST 1944EXTRACTS FROM WAR DIARIES AND MEMORANDA

(SERIES 6)

1. EXTRACTS FROM ACCOUNTS BY OFFICERS OF S.SASK R. OF OPERATIONS ON 20 JUL 44, AS GIVEN TO HIST OFFER 2 CDN INF DIV.(a) MAJOR J.S. EDMONDSON

.....We went through "D" Coy with pls in line ahead in the order 10, 11, 12. Then turning left I shifted to two up with 10 on the left, 12 in res, and 11 on right. On meeting up our first opposition "A" Coy on our left halted and we had to also, to be certain that we were not fired on from the rear. While "A" Coy was dealing with this opposition I moved the res pl to the left to fill up the gap between "A" Coy and us, using 11 pl as our firm base. They stayed there while the other pls went fwd so that we hit the coy objective with 12 on the left and 10 on the right. Then I ordered 11 pl fwd onto a mound ahead while the other pls consolidated. In other words, 11 pl stayed on the hillock and on its reverse slope while the other two pls mopped up further ahead on a fwd slope. All the while the Jerries were running back through the grain. In the midst of the consolidation four tanks appeared on our front, one at least of which was a Mk IV. One additional one was reported cam as a hay-stack SOUTH of the X rds. The PIATs were down beginning to dig but the tks were moving fwd eventually getting as close as 25 yds away and firing all the time. While the tks advanced I ordered a withdrawal to a reverse slope about 150 yds behind, close to "D" Coy and where the A tk gun screen was supposed to exist. The PIAT of 11 pl got one tk with two rounds and another round hit on a tk without known results...The PIAT of 12 pl had the amn bearer knocked out before he had brought the amn fwd.....

LESSONS:

1. Carry a round of amn in your PIAT ready to fire at once. Our adv was a very long one and we had slung our PIATs. This was a mistake.
2. Always have a firm base from which you can op.
3. A shovel for every two men is essential.
4. Don't attack without infm. The plan should be laid on carefully but the forces should be flexible and easily adapt themselves to changing situations. "F" Ech should come up as fast as possible leap-frogging the 3 in mortars fwd as they are especially useful for laying a smoke barrage against tks.
5. Tps should get some trg in fighting and consolidating on wheat fds where there are short fds of fire and little cover from fire. Control is difficult once the men go to ground as they cannot be seen. This is very different from trg in England. Watch mortar fire, wait a brief period and then go through it quickly.

6. The res pl comd might move with the rear coy HQ leaving an NCO with his pl so that he can receive immediate orders once contact is made.

(b) LIEUT. F. MATHERS

LESSONS:

1. Inf alone cannot consolidate immediately against counter attack unless they have sp for twenty mins in which to dig in. They should have tks right with them.
 2. At the ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE X rds we waited for the Fus MR to take out some MG posts at BEAUVOIR farm. This delay kept us behind our arty sp and SOUTH from there we had to fight heavily. The Fus MR did a coy right flank assault on the farm which went in very well and for which we gave LMG sp. But losing our barrage was costly.
 3. Our liaison during the attack both with 9 pl and the Fus MR was good but it was impossible to reach the Fus MR once we were on our objective as the enemy occupied the ground in between.
 4. Our Brens gave us some trouble but this was due to the extraordinary weather. First during our adv there was heat and dust and then later sudden hy rain. We fired rarely during the first period so that the Brens were not cleared of dust, and during the second period one Bren would fire in bursts, the others of the pl only single rounds. Our stens were completely O.K. We fired them holding the mags vertical and the ejection slot to the bottom so that if the force of the ejection was insufficient, gravity would push the spent casings out. We found 77 grenades best for bringing snipers out of manure piles and hay-stacks as the phosphorous smoke chased them out into the open. Our PIATs were good, but they were out-ranged and we could not take them farther fwd. Our greatest cas came from hy MGs and from the tk guns which later sniped against inf after the A tk guns were destroyed. Enemy sniping was poor.....
2. ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIONS OF THE RHLI IN THE BATTLE OF VERRIERES, 25 JUL 44, AS GIVEN BY LT-COL J.M. ROCKINGHAM TO HIST OFFR, 2 CDN DIV.

The RHLI plan for the capture of VERRIERES was to attack with three coys up, one in res with RIGHT A Coy, CENTRE B Coy, LEFT D Coy. D Coy with under comd 15 Pl, Res C Coy less 15 Pl. Carrier Pl to neutralize both flanks with LMG. The whole attack to be supported by arty concs lifting on a time programme.

The preliminary op was to be carried out by Fus MR which consisted of the capture of TROTEVAL FARM with one coy.

They were based on BEAUVOIR FARM to the WEST and planned to launch an attack with one coy at 2100 hrs D mins 1. D day was set for 25 Jul 44, H hr 0330 hrs. The attack was to take place under articial moonlight provided by a tp of SLs in the area of CAEN.

Taping parties from the Scout Pl RHLI under Lt Hinton were sent to the Fus MR to go in with the attack. Their task being to tape the start line and FUP which were in the area of TROTEVAL FARM. The Fus MR Coy Comd's carrier was blown up by a mine and the start line was NOT secured at 0130; a scout from the Scout Pl returned to BN HQ RHLI with a report that three German tks were sitting on the WEST end of the start line and preventing the taping from being carried out. It then became apparent that the RHLI would have to secure its own start line. A message was sent fwd to Lt Hinton to withdraw his own tps and Fus MR 500 yds to the NORTH and pass the codeword which would bring a conc of med arty on the tks. Two pls of C Coy were detailed to secure the start line as soon as the med conc had finished. Lt Hinton was unable to find Fus MR and as a result C Coy attacked the start line without arty being fired. RHLI requested that the conc for the main attack be delayed 30 mins; H hr for RHLI now being 0400. Searchlights however were turned on at 0330. C Coy drove off the tks and secured the start line by 0400 and the Bn crossed the start line at 0410 having suffered some cas.

ADV FROM SL TO OBJECTIVE

As soon as the coys crossed the SL and started across the open towards VERRIERES they were met by intense MG fire from both flanks and the front. The two flanking coys, A and D, got the worst of it and B Coy managed to get into the hedges about 300 yds to the NORTH of VERRIERES where hand to hand fighting took place. The MGs in the centre area were soon quietened, and the coy continued into the village and started house clearing ops.

A coy on the right, was pinned by the intense fire and was only able to get one pl into the hedges. D Coy on the left was in very much the same posn and the coy comd, Maj. G.H.B. Stinson was killed at this point and all of the NCOs. Lt Clark continued to lead the coy fwd.

At this time it began to get light and what had been thought to be MGs on the flank, turned out to be German tks. Neutralizing fire from carrier Pl, and arty had proved to be ineffective. The 17 pr tp in sp was ordered into action and from posns in the area of TROTEVAL FARM quickly accounted for four of these tks. An arty conc was laid on the MGs in the hedges on the right front and with the fire somewhat reduced, A and D Coys pushed fwd into the town and cleared the rest of the village.

In the meantime the tks and sp arms which were coming fwd, ran onto a tellermine fd and several vehs were blown up and the route blocked. Priority was given to three jeeps or carriers to come fwd to pick up the seriously wounded and then to A tk guns, mortars and carriers in that order.

Two A tk guns were got into posn at once to the front and the other three on the flanks. The counter attack by about nine tks came in within 20 mins of arrival on the objective.

These tks neutralized, then shot up the two fwd guns and one of the gun towers but the tks were beaten off by inf with PIATS grenades and smoke, two Mk IVs being destroyed by skilful use of the PIAT.

The res (C Coy) was then called fwd to consolidate in the area of the hedges to the NORTH of the village and was joined by the carrier pl who were a mob res.

The posn was then considered firm and codeword was passed at 0750 hrs and the R Regt of C came fwd and crossed the SL.

For the remainder of the day counter attacks by tks and inf were almost continuous. The village was heavily mortared and shelled by the enemy and by our own mediums and 4.2" mortars.

Rocket firing Typhoons were being directed onto the enemy tks by the use of RED smoke fired by our own arty. During the afternoon RED smoke was put onto the village and Typhoons fired rockets into the area.

This was quickly stopped by wireless and no satisfactory explanation could be given as to how the smoke had got there. Towards dusk a LO arrived from 131 Inf Bde and another from Armd Bde, both of the 7 Armd Div, and said that they were to help us. A tp of tks was moved in at once which raised the tps morale very greatly and inf bde was put in posn to the NORTH of TROTEVAL. Arty reps from 7 Armd Div arrived with reps of AGRA and the posn became more secure.

3. ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON PT 46 - (0655) 8 AUG 44 BY RHLI
AS GIVEN BY LT-COL G.M. MACLACHLAN, 10 AUG 44, TO HIST OFFR.

The First Cdn Army was given the task of breaking out of the bridgehead held SOUTH of CAEN over the river ORNE. The 4th Bde was given the first phase of the op which consisted of breaking out of the a/m line, doing an adv of about five miles and securing a firm base in area of CAILLOUET, Pt 46 square 0655 and high ground square 0756. The RHLI was given the task of securing the centre objective, Pt 46.

The plan was a most daring one, consisting of a break through on a front of 150 yds, with all personnel embussed in small arms proof vehs and an adv straight to the objectives following a hy arty barrage. The RHLI was given under comd - A Sqn 27 Cdn Armd Regt, one tp of SP M10s, one tp of Ram-towed 17 pdrs, a pl of Tor Scot MGs, a sec of Engrs and a pl of 4.2 Mortars, the latter for movement only. On 6 Aug a rehearsal was held in the concentration area and several practice runs to an imaginary objective carried out. The fm adopted was as follows:- the coln was formed up four vehs abreast, two ft between vehs laterally, and the front to rear distance between vehs to be determined by light conditions. The coln was led by two tps of A Sqn, with them two tps of special Br tks equipped to breach mine fds. This was known as a gapping and path finding force.

/DG

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The assault force, five minutes behind, was led by Sqn HQ of the tks, two tps of tks, A, B, Bn HQ, C and D Coys, with the MMGs, engrs, and 4.2 mortars bringing up the rear. This coln was to punch directly through the German line with no attempt to deal with local opposition along the route. When a pt just NORTH of the objective was reached, the tks were to dominate the objective while the inf consolidated quickly.

OPERATION

On the evening of 7 Aug 44 the coln formed up in the IFS area. At 2300 hrs it advanced in fmn to the SL which was the rd at BEAUVOIR FARM. At 2300 hrs the RAF commenced dropping 1000 lb bombs on objectives on either side of the route through which the thrust was to be made. At H hr, 2330, the coln commenced to move. The route was marked by the special tks dropping tape and coloured lights and they in turn were provided with Bofor tracer and a radio direction beam.

As the VERRIERES line was crossed the coln was met by small arms fire which caused no damage or cas. Five or six hundred yds SOUTH of VERRIERES, two vehs ran into bomb craters and became cas. The personnel aboard climbed into other vehs. Approaching ROCQUANCOURT the coln went off its route, turned EAST and became lost within ROCQUANCOURT itself. An enemy 88 mm gun began opening fire at pt blank range. This delay lost the coln the protection of the hy arty barrage. After considerable difficulty the coln got under way again, proceeded SOUTH through ROCQUANCOURT and reached the open ground on the airfield. This was crossed amidst MG and small arms fire and occasional A tk and mortaring. The coln at this pt was intact except for one sec of carriers, the MMG and the mortars which had become lost in ROCQUANCOURT. At 0400 hrs the objective was recognized ahead. The order of march of the coys at this time had become considerably mixed up, and some time was required to reorganize them for a possible assault. The objective was, however, found to have been abandoned and the coys moved quickly into their posns. It was decided, however, by Lt-Col MacLachlan, that no attempt at occupying Pt 46 would be made at this time, the area actually occupied being 200 yds NORTH. During the move down, the enemy was employing smoke extensively which was largely responsible for the loss of direction of the coln. A ground mist now settled and provided excellent cover for the consolidation period. At 0800 hrs this mist lifted and most at once the enemy attacked, employing between eight and ten SP guns and tks with some inf. This attack was taken on by A Sqn of the 27th Sherbrookes who destroyed two tks and an SP gun for the loss of one Sherman and one Sherman damaged. One M10 was knocked out. After pressing his attack with some vigour the enemy withdrew.

During the remainder of the day the right flank of the bn was subjected to occasional small arms and A tk fire. At 1800 hrs a fighting patrol was pushed to the quarry and reported it clear of the enemy. Later in the evening the RHC moved in and occupied this posn. Total cas for the op was one killed and thirteen wounded.

The Royal Regiment of Canada secured their objective after fighting in the early morning and pushed forward to GAUMESNIL. The Essex Scot, whose coln was considerably cut up in ROCQUANCOURT reorganized and captured their objective at 1200 hrs. The 4 Cdn Armd Div then moved through.

4. ACCOUNT OF A COY ATTACK ON TROTEVAL FARM BY FUS IIRs ON 23 JUL 44 GIVEN TO HIST OFFR BY MAJ J.A. DEXTRALE AT CAEN.

On 21 Jul, two days before this attack, my bn had put in an attack on BEAUVOIR (043614) and TROTEVAL (051613) FARMS and VERRIERS (052602). That attack ended with out holding BEAUVOIR FARM but we were not successful in taking TROTEVAL FARM or VERRIERS. Soon my CO was told that it was essential that TROTEVAL FARM be captured. This was necessary because 4 Bde was going to attack using as SL the EAST-WEST rd which runs just NORTH of TROTEVAL FARM. To secure the SL the farm had to be ours. The bn itself was not yet reinforced to the pt where a full coy could be spared for the attack on TROTEVAL FARM. Actually cooks and dvrs were being placed in the trenches to hold what ground we had taken. Because of this numerical lack in the bn, I was given the job of selecting a hand-picked coy of 75 all ranks for the attack on TROTEVAL FARM.

TROTEVAL FARM itself consists of a walled enclosure divided into an orchard to the SOUTH and gardens to the NORTH with the farmhouse and courtyard proper on the centre of the left flank. It is surrounded by open wheat fds. The night was clear and there was moonlight and visibility was excellent.

The force of the enemy was estimated to be about two pls with six tks. He had a valuable OP at 060606.

My gen plan was that, from a SL about 1000 yds NE of the farm, the coy, should adv with two pls up and one in res. On the 23 Jul at 2000 hrs we crossed the SL, which was merely a posn in the open wheat fds stretching from about 043619 to 047623. Our adv was through full-grown wheat fds although the right pl did meet some fds of more open ground. The fwd pls were to encircle the flanks of the farm and, once they were in posn and almost simultaneously, the res pl was to strike the farm from the NW corner as the fwd pls opened fire from the flanks. Then as the centre pl cleared the buildings and the orchard to the SOUTH, the res pls were to be moving their southernmost secs around to the rear so that the rear would be covered with fire and the cut-off completed.

In sp I had 1 sqn of tks, 1 fd regt, 1 med regt, 4.2 mortars, and the 3" mortars of the Fus IIRs and the S Sask R. The tks were in rear covering each flank. 3" mortar was to give left flank fire for 20 mins on our very open left flank. From H minus 30 to H plus 4 the mediums were to play on the farm. From H plus 15 to H plus 19 they fired on VERRIERS and TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE. From H plus 15 the arty lifted but the fd regt remained on call. Two A tk guns were also in sp and these I planned to place behind the farm itself to cover our flanks. Task 2 for the 3" mortar was

around the area of the rd VERRIERES -HUBERT FOLIE. The 4.2 mortars gave us screening fire in the area NE of TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE from H plus 20 to H plus 40. I put eight LMGs at pt 045614. These came into action at H plus 45. Belts of DF fire were ready to be laid completely around the objective with 6 Fd Regt.

We moved very close, only 75 yds from our barrage, taking the chance, in this case luckily, that no one would be hit. My appreciation was that there were so many men in the farm that if my force of 75 had been 300 yds behind the barrage, the force in the farm would have had time to re-organize in such strength as to prevent us from seizing and holding the farm.

My adv was very fast, about 80 yds per min. The centre pl pushed for the NW corner as soon as the flank fire pls were in place. As the pl went in from the NW corner, the flanking pl sent their secs to the rear to give a cut-off by cross-fire so that the farm was surrounded with automatic fire. At that moment there were no bodies behind the farm so that the clearing pl was able to fire freely without endangering the other pls. We reached our objective about 2015 hrs. Clearing the farm took about 15 mins. Just as we waited nearby for the arty to lift we could see Jerry running through the Orchard and farm buildings from the fds with neither helmets nor weapons. Tks appeared very shortly afterwards and opened on the flank pls. We replied by attacking them with PIATs and grenades. The tks had been harboured just over a small crest and appeared first about 150 yds from the farm.

When a force is small in relation to the objective it seeks to hold, consolidation should be close on the objective. In this case we of course did not consolidate in the farm but we did not go more than 50 yds away from it except the rear pl which covered a rather larger area. The fwd pls remained close around the farm. It is not wise to consolidate three or four hundred yds past an objective, unless one has considerable force. In this case we occupied the slit trenches Jerry himself had built.

At 0200 hrs we received an order to withdraw by 0300 hrs because tks were moving in on me on the left flank, and bde planned to bring arty on them to get rid of them. I could not report these because my wireless was off and I felt that in any case we were dug in and were in little danger. Originally there were six tks hull-down just on the crest about 150 yds SOUTH of TROTEVAL FARM. When they approached us we attacked them with PIATs and 36 grenades. Four of them moved off to the SW and two others moved to the SE. Finally we heard them again about 0200 hrs when we were ordered to withdraw. The med arty fire drove them away although it probably did not injure them. At 0300 hrs I pulled out with all my men except one sec of one pl which I left against orders in order to protect our A tk guns. The men came out gradually and orderly. At this time there was a great deal of shelling and air attack as well. When the arty shoot was finished, we re-occupied the farm without opposition.

My men took only their weapons, skeleton web, and a ground sheet in which was rolled a tin of bully-beef and some hard-tack. Each man carried two 36 grenades and with each Bren there were 15 mags. No body armour was worn.

I had 18 Brens instead of the usual 9 and thus had only bren gps. The No 2's carried rifles and the sec leaders carried stens, but there were no rifle gps as such. Each pl had one PIAT and six Brens, a total of 25 men per pl. The actual clearing of the farm was done with LMGs and 36 grenades. The Brens were carried with a sling and when held firmly against the hip were as flexible as was necessary. Our sec leaders picked up rifles which they found in the area, which belonged to the men of my bn who had been cas during the attack two days ago. The arty had knocked holes in the walls and in post of the buildings, but one buildings had no opening in it and a PIAT was used to cut a way through. The PIAT explosion brought Jerry crawling out.

The enemy of course did not occupy the farm but had LMG s in the corners of the orchard. He was outside in the fds when our shells came down, apparently caught unexpectedly. He never thought we were so close. The garden and orchard had snipers and they were out in the fds as well. We found slit trenches inside the walls and outside. MG posts were located in the two northern corners of the wall and to the SW in the fd.

His defences included a string of mines about 50 yds from the farm circling all around it, flat on the ground with just a bit of hay to cover the mines. We lost two carriers because of these. We found one sniper in the orchard tied into a tree with ropes. He must have stayed there through the barrage with only his amn and rifle and how he stood our fire, I don't know. No snipers were upstairs at the windows. In reply to our shelling Jerry shelled the right and left flanks of the farm. He evidently did not expect our entry to be from the corner on diagonal. Because we stayed so close to the barrage, his DF fire came down where he expected us to be at this time, that is, a safe distance behind us. His snipers were poor shots but his tks were good.

Jerry is no good at night. He needs only noise to frighten his away. On one occasion a burst of Bren fire unaimed into a fd caused him to pull out from the area.

Our arty was marvellous. All its DF tasks were carried out when requested and VERRIERES, TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE, and the areas NW of VERRIERES were surrounded with belts of fire, in fact there was protective fire all round. This fire was very accurate. I left two secs to protect my A Tk guns on withdrawal and my men were 150 yds from the farm itself. Fire came down on the farm, yet no men were hit. The rest of the coy had pulled out 5 mins before the barrage began.

LESSONS

1. Vehs must have sand-bags in them and offrs must check to see that they remain in. This will save lives and vehs.

2. Always tell your men exactly where you, the coy Comd will be at various phases of the battle. The pl comds and sec leaders will come for no reason at all or will invent silly errands to come and see if you are there. Knowing you are there reassures them. Do not let them worry. If the wireless link with bn is out, do not mention it, merely tell them all is well. When they know where you are and feel that you are confident they themselves will be confident and aggressive.
3. The comd must stay back, until the show is over, at a pt where he can view all his forces or at least know what they are doing. It is unwise to go fwd because the risk of losing a comd is serious and because he must be able to see the whole battle if he is to influence it. If he is with the fwd pl he is unable to find out what the other pls are doing. There are other ways and other places for the coy comd to show that he is not afraid.
4. When advancing go slowly and thoroughly. Burn every haystack. Clear a few houses thoroughly and not many haphazardly.
5. We have a preponderance of eqpt and should use it boldly.
6. Don't consolidate too far fwd of your objective if you have a small force.
7. SBs should be well forward.
8. Weapons ~~must~~ be picked up from cas and kept with the part of the coy which is still fighting.
9. Rfts should, if possible, accustom themselves to battle gradually.
10. Take chances with the arty barrage, being close to it is essential. Where sticky fighting is likely, for example in a village clearing, the arty lift should be so arranged that thoroughness in clearing does not mean losing the barrage.
11. Men never forget. An offr's influence on his men in times of action varies with the consideration he has shown them in trg. If they respect him during trg, they will respond to his control under fire.
12. DF fire tasks must be laid down all around the objective beforehand. There is neither time nor opportunity in action to indicate targets.
13. Supporting arms are the key to success. Their use must be carefully planned.
14. When the enemy comes out unarmed with his hands up or with the evident intention to surrender, don't shoot him. This saves a lot of trouble for if the first few are treated properly the whole bunch will follow. Caution, however, is necessary.

5. ACCOUNT OF A COY ATTACK BY ESSEX SCOT. 29 JUL 44 -
EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, ESSEX SCOT. R.

29 Jul - D Coy under Comd Major T.E. Steele, were ordered to attack and capture the high ground at MR060606 on CAEN-FALAISE RD.

INF: Enemy - Holding high ground at MR060606 with known strong points at North and South end each containing at least one .42 MMG. Strength about one pl of SS Pz Div.

Own Tps - D coy and u/c one sec carriers, one MFC, 1 sec A tk guns and in sp 4 and 5 Fd Regt RCA and one pl 'C' coy Essex Scottish Regiment plus supporting fire of one tp tks.

INTENTION: D coy will capture and hold high ground at 060606.

METHOD: At 1655 hrs tp tks opened up with arty fire on ruined house at South end of objective. Maintained for five mins. At 1700 hrs the attack began with arty putting down a murder fire on North and South ends of objective and a conc on orchard between two strong fire. This lasted till 1708 hrs. The arty was inaccurate, some rounds falling 300 yds short. At 1700 hrs inf moved fwd, No 16 & 17 pl and No. 18 pl in rear of coy HQ. Carrier sec (dismounted) moved with coy HQ. No. 15 pl C coy moved to rt flank of objective giving flank protection and covering fire. At 1708 when arty lifted, D coy started its assault, having to cross 300 yd of ground before hitting enemy. No. 16 pl with the task of capturing the north strong point and consolidating there failed to reach their obj and were pinned down by hy MMG fire. No. 17 pl with task of clearing centre of orchard made a successful attack and consolidated in proper area and put up two 2" M flares to indicate their success. On this signal No. 18 pl assaulted strong point at South end of objective, capturing it and consolidating there. At the same time coy HQ moved across the road, put in an assault on the orchard coming under intense MMG fire from strong point at north end of orchard. Seeing No. 16 pl had failed in its objective, Major Steele ordered Sgt. Burdick (OC 17 PL) to organize and take out strong point at North end. This time Sgt. Burdick was killed. Major Steele was then notified his FOO was badly wounded. He went back to the FOO, learned his DF and DF SOS tasks then ordered him to be evacuated. Now CSM Dixon came fwd with the coy carrier, also the sec of A tk guns under Sgt Wold. CSM Dixon having grenades in his carrier ordered his dvr to drive along the hedge row from where MMG fire was coming. As he passed the slits he tossed out grenades. This did not remedy the situation so the coy comd ordered the CSM to organize another party and to wipe out the opposition. He did this with three men giving covering fire while he went fwd dropping 36 grenades into the enemy slits. This brought results. All remaining enemy were killed or captured. No. 16 pl now came fwd and consolidated on the north end of objective. Counter attack was immediate by means of hy mortar fire. The coy successfully held this important ground which gave observation in all directions. The damaged building turned out to be a waterworks with a reservoir of 30000 litres supplying adjacent enemy held towns. It is little wonder they wished to hold point 060606.....

6. ACCOUNT BY SGT PALFENIER, SIGS SGT, CALG HIGERS, OF HIS ACTIONS DURING THE BN ATTACK ON MAY-SUR-ORNE NIGHT 24/25 JUL 44. GIVEN TO HIST OFFR, 2 CDN DIV.

My job in the bn attack upon MAY-SUR-ORNE was to follow behind "B" Coy, one of the leading coys, whose objective was the area around the church in MAY-SUR-ORNE. Leaving the area about Pt 67, 0263, was upset by our tpt being blocked by fire from enemy 88ms. The signal vehs were lost temporarily except for a jeep which I had managed to assemble from three jeeps which had been hit and abandoned near our location, 024641, SOUTH of FLEURY-SUR-ORNE. By the time I brought the jeep down to the X rds in ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE, "B" Coy had by-passed to the left and I was out of touch with them. "C" Coy was in the area, however, advancing down the main rd towards MAY-SUR-ORNE. This was about 0400 hrs and it was dark and smoky. I backed the jeep into the area nearby off the rd and helped "C" Coy which was then at about 02056110. "C" Coy was held up by snipers and I did my best to help them fwd. Then I went back to the HQ area NORTH of ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE above the orchards, 018618.

This was between 0500 hrs and 0600 hrs. "A" Coy had reached MAY-SUR-ORNE. The CO ordered me to go down the rd and lay cable to "A" Coy which were located about 027594. I got the jeep fixed and drove down the rd. Just across the rd from the factory and in the ditches on either side and in the diagonal gully, 020601, there were about 24 Jerries. We ran onto them, threw some smoke. They took about three shots at us and then threw up their hands, 12 on the rd, gps of 8 and 6 on the sides, running down the rd. One shot hit the jeep but I piled two men of the cable party into the jeep, put the gear shift into high, and stepped on the gas, knocking them all off the rd. About 50 feet past them we stopped and turned on them with a sten. Two of them got away to the diagonal gully, the rest were captured. There was no opposition along the rd except for this and what we met in ST MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY. We laid our cable as far as 021598 along the rd. There, we saw a sign on the edge of a building saying MAY-SUR-ORNE and I was very glad to have got my cable fwd that far. Directly ahead was the X rds near which was to be our Bn HQ. I turned left and went out along the rd and got in touch with "A" Coy. They were on the high ground in a bit of woods EAST of MAY-SUR-ORNE. I was out of cable for we had only one mile on one spool, plus a third of a mile on another. When I came back I left my two cable layers in MAY-SUR-ORNE to guard our cable while I went back in the jeep to get some more cable from the sigs truck which I hoped by this time had been brought fwd to the HQ area. I stopped at the church in MAY-SUR-ORNE and drove somewhat past it to 020593. I left the jeep idling in the centre of the rd in order to draw the fire of any snipers onto the jeep instead of onto my cable layers. I feel that the Jerries had pulled out of MAY-SUR-ORNE on the approach of "A" Coy just as we had discovered them pulling out of the factory area when we reached that on our trip SOUTH. MAY-SUR-ORNE was absolutely devoid of tps.

I then returned NORTH along the rd in the jeep. I met about three Jerries again on the return trip, dealt with them and got back to the CO. Across the rd between ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE and ST MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY a mine fd had been put at about 021608. On our way down we had driven through the mine fds chancing that we would escape. Going back I moved somewhat more carefully and looked at the mines with a little more care. They were hastily laid on the asphalt surface and about 5 or 6 of them I found out later were laid with a double mine below. I reported to the CO what I had seen and asked for men to guard the cable. The CO asked me if a sec of carriers would do, but I said there were mines to get through. I was ordered to go fwd and get through the mine fds with my men either mounted or dismounted. This was about 0700 hrs, so I drove down the rd with one jeep leading three carriers behind.

At the SOUTH ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE X rds I again met "C" Coy. The coy cmd stopped me and warned me against going fwd. I had to tell him that I had already been fwd. On the 2nd trip fwd, when we reached the mine fds, I told the carrier cmd that there were Jerries in the fds on the left. By the time I got through the mine fds in the jeep the carriers had turned round and gone back and there were only five men of his sec left in the ditch nearby. I told him I would go fwd to hold the cable with my five men and that he should come fwd to sp me and "A" coy as soon as possible. He went back to find the lead carrier had struck a mine and so was held up.

I meanwhile went fwd with my men. The phone to MAY-SUR-ORNE had been through and had been working but went out shortly before this time. The break we discovered, was in the factory area. This was about 0745 hrs. Again we found no one in MAY-SUR-ORNE. This is borne out by the fact that the two signalmen were able to stay in posn undisturbed. Soon the sigs got through again. "C" Coy, when I left them, had got to the SOUTH edge of ST MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY 011605, and I felt that they would soon be fwd. I could not get the cable out to "A" Coy as they were held down by fire. Bn HQ was to have been in the ditch near the X rds by the church. We were held down by arty fire as was "A" Coy. Because of this we could not get through to "A" Coy. I, therefore, went back on my fourth trip to Bn HQ. The CO now ordered me to come fwd and show the A tk Pl cmd where "A" Coy and "D" Coy were located. I came fwd again to the end of the buildings in ST MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY. "C" Coy were held up just NORTH of the factory, 021605. From what I could see the enemy consisted of MG fire from the factory itself and from snipers located in the power pylons which ran NW across the rd NORTH of the diagonal gully, 011611. There was also an overhead br at this pt. I picked up a Bren because no one seemed to be returning fire on the factory or on the pylons and let out a burst at each transformer box on the pylons and altogether used up about six mags. About 43 Jerries surrendered soon after to "C" Coy and then the A tk offr decided that it was too hot to recce further fwd. I, therefore, decided to escort the PW back and go on with my cable laying. At this stage the arty fire was lighter and it would have been possible to lay cable out to "A" Coy. When I reached Bn HQ with the PW, I found that the line was out. I went fwd with a cpl and a

pte to a pt on the rd just SOUTH of the diagonal gulley, 011600. The whole coy was in the left hand ditch. Snipers and one Schmeisser again were delaying the adv. Once more I left the jeep in the middle of the rd and stood myself for about 10 mins with no fire. Then suddenly they let out a burst of Schmeisser fire on us. We had two Brens and with them Pte Davies and I peppered the whole area. Between us we drove a sniper out of the bush and Pte Davies got him as he was running away. We mended the cable and went forward to find "C" Coy just entering MAY-SUR-ORNE, 011597. As we drove up into the town we drew fire. There seemed to be a couple of Jerries walking across the rd and a few more coming fwd into MAY-SUR-ORNE. They fired on us and we replied. I put our Bren on my own side with our rifles on the other and we gave some sp to "C" Coy as they advanced. Very hy arty fire was coming down and added to this was all the enemy fire which the jeep was drawing. As "C" Coy appeared about to pull out and as it was very hot, I got into the jeep and turned it around. Then we drove back to Bn HQ. We had laid cable to about pt 015596 towards "A" Coy, but by this time "A" Coy had gone back. After returning to Bn HQ I made a fifth trip only to the NORTH outskirts of the orchards in MAY-SUR-ORNE, 011596.

Our signal eqpt had been built up while we were near Pt 67. That rd and 4 rds had been taped with 88mm which landed squarely in our pl area. Every time traffic went up or down the rd fire came down, and the vehs knocked out landed squarely into our area. Eventually three jeeps piled up and the sigs pl helped as best they could to rescue the occupants. In one case we saved the jeep which was drawing fire on our own men by driving it down the rd towards FLEURY-SUR-ORNE on the stumps of its wheels. We managed to put the fire out of another jeep and from all these my pl built one complete jeep. We scrounged a cable layer from Div. This cut our difficulties in half. During the battle we had very hy losses of eqpt, especially wireless sets, and replacing them under hy enemy mortar and MG fire was extremely difficult with only a 15 cwt and MC. The jeep was able to bring fwd new eqpt quickly from the rear and to deliver it rapidly without loss. This had a tremendous effect on the morale of the rifle coys for they felt that they were being firmly supported when replacements came up quickly. I feel that this jeep was the only way we could have got our eqpt fwd, because the 15 cwt had to remain fwd with its load of vital stores. I also feel that the comms were the key to this battle.

Our cas in the pl to a great extent resulted from trying to send wireless messages. Every time the aerial went up, down came Jerry's fire. For comn under such hy fire a new system of R/T procedure should be stream-lined. Every time the 22 set went on the air at Bn HQ we got mortared. Also when we were under hy mortar fire our lines went quickly and we found that the best way to maintain comms was to use a single party-line lay-out. With a shortened R/T procedure and economy in sending messages the party-line system is sufficient and it reduces the amount of wire which one pl has to maintain. Also because it is a circular

form of comm there are two lines and if one is broken the other half of the circle may still remain intact. Later a ladder of lines may be laid to give added safety. We found when we were on Pt 67 that the system of individual lines meant that along one stretch of heavily mortared rd we had to maintain three cables to fwd coys and on one occasion I went up the ditch 14 times in a single night to maintain these lines. Later we used the single line system and found maintenance much easier.

7. REPORT ON BRIDGING OPERATION NIGHT 14/15 AUG 44 BY MAJOR D.W. CUNNINGTON, O.C., 16 CDN FD COY.

At 2100 hrs 14th Aug 44 CRE stated that two way Cl 40 crossing was required over the River Liaison in the vicinity of ROUVRES. I immediately despatched Lt Schofield unit recce Officer to make a reconnaissance and arranged an r.v. for him to meet the Pl Offr who would be doing the job.

The Pl Offr, and advance party of 1 Sec left Coy area at 2200 hrs, the remainder of the Pl under Pl Sgt at 2400 hrs, and the br eqpt (40' D.S. Bailey) at 0130 hrs under the second recce Officer Lt Cameron. The lapse of time between the departure of the parties was due to the late arrival of the br eqpt at the advance stores sec 3 Fd Pk Coy RCE as it was originally intended that the eqpt and the Pl would go forward together at 2300 hrs.

The distance between the Coy area and the br site was long (6 miles) the night was exceptionally dark and no member of the Coy had ever traversed the route before. These factors coupled with the fact that the entire 2nd Cdn Corps seemed to be on the move all combined to delay the arrival of the eqpt and the Pl on the site until 0700 hrs.

In the meantime the pl officer had arrived, obtained information from the recce officer, completed the recce, and started work on bank seats for one bridge. A civilian br was still in existence 300 yds down stream, also a fascine made crossing passable to both tracks and wheels, so the Pl Officer correctly assumed that all that was now required was on Cl 40 br. Also as two crossings were at present available he was in a position to erect a deliberate br with proper dug in bank seats rather than a hasty one as had originally been suggested. These views were conveyed to me and I confirmed them.

Because of approaches, Lt Kenyon decided to build on the site of the destroyed civilian bridge although it involved considerable work in digging in bank seats. However by the use of the compressor bank seats were completed by the time the br eqpt arrived. Br eqpt was immediately unloaded and one 30 ft S.S. Cl 40 Bailey erected and open for traffic by 1100 hrs. It was possible to build right on the site and no launching was done.

An effort was made to obtain dressing to cover the decking through official channels but when this failed, dressing was obtained from damaged houses in the vicinity. This took some time and dressing was not completed until 1400 hrs 16th Aug 44.

The decision to dig down bank seats and erect a permanent bridge was well founded as immediately after completion all maintenance traffic for 3 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Cdn Armd Div and the entire Polish Armd Div passed over it at the rate of 600 vehs per hour.

A summary of timings is as follows:-

(a) Recce Officer left	2100 hrs	14 Aug 44
(b) Pl Officer and advance party left	2200 hrs	"
(c) Platoon left	2400 hrs	"
(d) Br eqpt. left	0130 hrs	15 Aug 44.
(e) Pl Offr arrived on site	0145 hrs	"
(f) Recce completed and bank seats started	0230 hrs	"
(g) Br Eqpt and Platoon arrived on site	0700 hrs	"
(h) Unloading completed	0815 hrs	"
(i) Construction commenced	0900 hrs	"
(j) Br open for traffic	1100 hrs	"
(k) Dressing in place	1400 hrs	16 Aug 44

8. A FIELD AMBULANCE UNIT IN HONOLULU: EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY OF 11 CDN FD AMB., JULY 1944.

GENERAL SUMMARY

It is our purpose to give a description of the set-up in this unit during the past month. Points which are considered essential to the smooth functioning of the unit will be emphasized. At all times it must be borne in mind that the prime purpose of a Fd Amb is the evacuation of cas from place of injury to medical installation (CCS or FDS) where they can be adequately treated.

The ADS is only one link in the chain of evacuation. Its function is to ensure that patients arriving from forward areas are in a suitable condition to make the trip back to higher med set ups. It is the largest single part of a Fd Amb and will be described first.

The first essential in an ADS is space and room for expansion if necessary. There must be plenty of room. We found that by erecting Portable shelters No. 11 as per diagram that we could have plenty of space for admitting, treatment, walking cases, and discharge wards, with 3 - 160 lb tents which could increase the size of our discharge wards if for any reason we were unable to evacuate cas readily. Another essential is good lighting throughout the ADS. The admitting clerk must be able to see properly to document the patient, the MO must have adequate light to examine the patient, administer Tetanus Toxoid and dress the wounds or start intravenous therapy. In the discharge ward there must be sufficient light that the A&D Book Clerk can do his work.

It was found that a circular, or horse-shoe-shaped driveway, with Ads inside the road was the best for the purpose. The patients were off-loaded at the entrance to the admitting tent then Ambs drove on around the road, picked up blankets and stretchers, and returned to CCP, or sections. Legible signs for various internal departments were found to be of great help. White tape was used to mark out the roadway and ensure that all vehs kept to the proper channels. To keep down the dust crude oil was sprinkled around the driveway and in front of the admitting tent. Sanitary control had to be strict to keep the fly menace to a minimum.

Well-trained clerks, dressers, and orderlies proved to be invaluable. Our set-up called for two admitting clerks, 3 dressers, and one A&D **Book Clerk working 12 hour shifts.** In addition, stretcher bearers were on hand to carry patients. Two orderlies were on duty at all times who were familiar with transfusion apparatus. One orderly saw to the providing of sterile dressings. A junior NCO or Senior private was delegated as despatcher of patients - his duty was to sort patients into various loads, to see that priority patients were promptly and carefully loaded, and sent on their way with a minimum of delay.

All wounded patients received T.T. or A.T.S. (Cdn or BR). All wounded except belly wounds, or cases unable to swallow were given 37½ gr of sulphanilamide at ADS. Back rests constructed by our carpenters were found useful for sucking wounds of the chest. Plasma stands which would attach to stretcher handles were a necessity for travelling transfusions. Unfortunately our experience has been that the return of these items from CCS is poor, so new ones are being constructed constantly.

S.D. scissors for M.O.'s and dressers are a necessity. When rushed the MO or dresser can slit up clothing to adequately expose the wounds or make a nick in the sleeve to administer T.T. or A.T.S.

One point of caution is that slack times uniforms shouldn't be wantonly mutilated by over zealous dressers.

Another important point is the side-tracking or walking wounded or exhaustion cases. They shouldn't be allowed to clog up the treatment tent. This can be avoided by a separate channel for this type of cases.

Hot tea and food should be available at all times, so that patients in discharge tent can be fed. No brandy or rum was used at ADS, as it is common knowledge that they are vasodilators and so contraindicated in the wounded.

In treatment tent a bench was provided for stretcher bearers, so that when they were not actually working they were sitting down out of the way. If allowed to stand around they add to the congestion. In discharge tent benches were used for walking wounded and exhaustion cases.

In admitting tent the admitting clerk filled out MFM 3210 original and duplicate, initiated a sulpha card - saw that regimental particulars of patient were on 3118 and envelope and inserted specialist report cards if necessary.

In treatment tent M.O. assessed the case, ordered treatment and filled out documents. Dressers did most of the dressings with M.O. doing the more difficult ones, i.e. splints, transfusions, etc.

At the ADS the impression is received that very few First Field Dressings are being used. Also the shell dressing that each soldier carries is not being used, but the 'stretcher' bearers in the field are using dressings from their haversacks.

Q.M. and Dispensing Sgt kept a constant check on supplies and equipment to ensure that they did not run short. Reports were compiled by orderly room staff and it was their responsibility to see that they were signed and sent to the proper authorities on time. This should be automatic as officers have no time for reports when ADS is busy.

Part of one Coy of the Fd Amb formed a Casualty Collecting Post about 1-2 miles behind the R.A.Ps. The CCP was formed by two M.Os. (sometimes plus one S.B.O.) and approximately 30 O.Rs. Regular Section equipment was used with varying numbers of ambulances (heavy & light). A good solid building, well-sandbagged, was found useful as a location for a CCP. This was the first place that patients could be examined at night, as it is not found possible to set up an RAP that can be blacked out further forward. In many cases no dressings are applied before the patient gets to the CCP.

Although detachments of the Fd Amb are up with the RMO at the RAP at times, it hasn't proved expedient to transport patients from Bn jeeps to Fd Amb jeeps at RAP, Bn jeeps have been carrying wounded from forward coys right back to ADS.

It has been found that a full stretcher bearer section is not necessary at each Bn RAP in static warfare. All that was needed was one or two jeep amb plus orderlies - plus about 2-4 stretcher bearers to load patients onto jeeps.

From ADS patients are evac to next Med installation by MAC, who do a very efficient job. Along the route to CCS or FDS they have a check point and as one veh goes back to CCS another MAC amb is despatched to the Fd Amb. We found that having two or three MAC vehs at ADS was sufficient, and at no time were there insufficient MAC vehs.

IMPRESSION

It was found impracticable to keep a record of times of wounding. The majority of cases, however, are at the ADS in $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 hr after wounding. During a night-action, while the walking wounded are out early, cases unable to walk or crawl are often not picked up until morning. This applies especially to casualties occurring in standing wheat, or where our troops had passed on and had not been able to notify stretcher bearers of the location of the wounded.

S.I.W's. are difficult to diagnose. About 15 cases were evacuated where the man was cleaning his rifle, and just as the pull-through came out a bullet went through his left foot from above downwards. These are reported to units for investigation.

Exhaustions are decreasing in numbers as the troops are becoming accustomed to battle noises.

Above 20 - 50% of sitting cases are made lying cases in the ADS.


140 pints of plasma were used. About 10% required one pint only, the remainder two or three pints. Cases were just retained for resuscitation, no longer than required to put them on the up grade for travelling. Meat was not required.

GENERAL SUMMARY

RETURNS FOR JULY 1944

No Admitted	CDN	BR	POW	TOT
Officers	47	5	-	
O.Rs.	975	194	9	
Dead on Adm	9	3	nil	
Died after Adm	4	-	-	
Sick Loss Mzh	73	7	-	
Exhaustion (Mild)	35	5	-	
Exhaustion (Severe)	32	31	-	
Battle Cas	727	150	9	
S.I.Ws.	1	1	-	
Accidents	45	5	-	
* Lying Cases	547	131	7	
* Sitting cases	475	68	2	
No evacuated-Officers	47	5	-	52
O.R's.	962	192	9	1163
				1215
* Discharge from ADS.				

SKETCH MAP OF MAY-SUR-ORNE AREA



LEGEND

Main Roads

Secondary Roads.....

Railway

Railway (Narrow Gauge)...

Rivers.....

Orchards.....

Churches.....



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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

26 Sep 44

CANADIAN OPERATIONS - NORTH WEST EUROPE
Extracts from Memoranda (Series 7)

1. Further to my 24/AEF/1/2 (Hist), dated 11 Sep 44, attached are additional Extracts from Memoranda dealing with Canadian Operations in North-West Europe.
2. These extracts are circulated for general information only, and opinions stated are not to be considered as necessarily expressions of official doctrine.

(Signed) W.H.S. Macklin Brig,
 for (K. Stuart) Lieut - General,
 Chief of Staff
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CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

AUGUST 1944

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDA

(SERIES 7)

1. ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE S.D. & G. HIGHRS 14-15
AUG 44, GIVEN TO HIST OFFR 3 CDN DIV BY LT.COL. R. ROWLEY
O.C. S.D. & G. HIGHRS.

I

1. On 14 Aug SD & G Highrs formed up on the right flank of the div, close behind 10 Cdn Armd Regt. The start line was the road running NE from LA CROIX to SOIGNOLLES. The inter-brigades boundary was the track running SE, called the Chemin Hausse.

2. The task of SD & G Highrs was to advance to the R LIAISON where the track crosses it at 156475, (which was the Eastern boundary), and to clear the valley westwards on the NORTH bank to the track crossing at 141465. (See Appendix "A")

3. The inf, in Priests (formerly SP guns), and half-track armd cars, formed up line abreast on the start line. At 1200 hrs, under cover of smoke laid down by the arty, the advance began. Owing to the smoke and dust, it was found difficult to keep direction, but shortly the troops found themselves at the edge of the wooded area lining the river, having arrived there before the tanks. Here they debussed, since it was impracticable to drive the vehicles further, and entered the woods to clear them of the enemy.

4. The effect of surprise seemed to have been achieved. The enemy, who occupied the area in considerable strength, surrendered after brief engagements, and an enormous quantity of equipment was taken. From this small portion of the river valley 220 PW were captured. The speed with which the action was executed may be judged from the fact that 50 mins after H-hr the leading coys had seized their objectives. This included an initial advance of several miles from the start line to the river valley itself.

5. During the battle B Coy experienced difficulty in consolidating its posn around the Chateau, 143468, owing to the presence of four enemy MG posts on their front. A Tiger tank was moreover sited nearby so that no flanking attack could be executed from the right. Flame-throwing carriers (Wasps) were sent for and three of the posts were effectively dealt with, one being engaged at the extraordinary range of 120 yds. The fourth MG post was at once abandoned, and no further interference was experienced from that quarter. (See Appendix "B")

6. In this area, too, a tank-stalk was organized to destroy a Tiger tank which was causing serious trouble, for it had already knocked out three Crocodiles (tank flame-throwers). It was successfully located and knocked out by a 6-pdr detachment, another triumph for the recently developed Discarding Sabot Ammunition.

7. On the evening of 14 Aug 44, D Coy crossed the stream at MONTBOINT, and cleared the village to the bridge at the WEST of it.

II

8. On the morning of 15 Aug 44, OILLY LE TESSON and PAYE were reported clear of enemy. The bn then captured the ring contour 180, in square 1345, and commenced moving down the valley of the LAISON, clearing the villages of ST QUENTIN DE LA ROCHE, POUSSANDRE, and TASSILLY and seizing the bridge over the river at PONT GRIMANT astride the CAEN-FALAISE road.

9. The operation was executed as described below. When the ring contours had been secured, D Coy moved to the high ground dominating the valley from the EAST, while the remainder of the bn advanced along the river below. D Coy had with it one sec of carriers and one sec of 6-prs, as well as a FOO of 14 Cdn Fd Regt. Left flanking protection was skilfully provided by 11 Pl, CH of O, (MG) who operated on an axis parallel to D Coy's, leap-frogging their guns forward to keep pace with the advance.

10. In the valley were A Coy leading, followed by C, with under command an assault sec of pioneers, a sec of carriers, a sec of 6-prs and a sec of Wasps. Both coys avoided the obvious defile at ST QUENTIN DE LA ROCHE and proceeded Eastwards over the higher ground, swinging again towards the valley to enter POUSSANDRE and TASSILLY.

11. Little or no opposition was met for the most of the way, the enemy having withdrawn hurriedly. At POUSSANDRE the bridge was discovered to be prepared for demolition, although it had not been blown. The crossings at TASSILLY, a little further on, were reported intact by A Coy. As the coys passed through TASSILLY, the carrier pl formed a recce screen in front and located three MG positions, an inf position, an 88 mm gun and two 81 mm mortar positions.

12. As the advance neared PONT GRIMANT, the high ground on the left over which D Coy had been travelling, rapidly deteriorated and one pl was pinned down by ennv fire. The other two pls brought down heavy fire support and the MG pl moved further to the flank, with the result that the cause of the trouble was removed and the pl released. The sec of carriers also played a major part in extricating the pl.

13. The Bn consolidated in the area of the bridge. Immediately to their front lay heavier opposition, for the cluster of villages SOULANGY, LE COGNET, ST LOUP and GLATIGNY - was strongly held by the enemy. But SD & G Highrs were not required to capture them, this area being left to 7 Cdn Inf Bde.

2. REPORT ON WASP MK II (CANADIAN) DATED 17 AUG 44 BY LT.COL. R. ROWLEY O.C. S.D. & G. HIGHRS.

First succesful use of Wasp Mk II (Cdn) by S.D.& G. Highrs.

1. During the mopping up of the breach made in the River Laison by the 2 Armd Bde and 9 C.I.B. the SD & G Highrs were on the right flank. B Coy (Appendix "B") reached their objective but were unable to consolidate as they were under heavy enemy fire from their immediate front. Flanking operations were impossible due to the fact that on the right there was a Tiger Tank which prevented any flanking movement in that direction. This tank was so sited as to cover all lines of approach on that flank. On the left, flanking movements were out of the question as both bridges over the liaison were under .

heavy small arms fire from MG No.3; also enemy posns over the river. It was, in fact, a well laid out German position with both ground and choice posns in their favour.

2. Sequence of Events that followed:

A. B Coy Comd requested "Wasps" who were held in the hand of the Bn Comd well forward. It had been planned that the Wasp Sec would work in cooperation with a Carrier Sec.

B. Wasps moved to position in readiness in rear of B Coy where the Carrier Pl Comd was put in the picture by 2 i/c B Coy.

C. Pl Comd Carrier Pl went on recce choosing lines of adv for "Wasps alone", having appreciated that moving a carrier sec to a cut off posn was impossible.

D. Wasps moved forward on chosen lines of adv as per trace with the Sec Comd on the right flank and Sec 2 i/c on the left.

E. The Sec Comd's carrier drew the first fire as had been anticipated, mainly from German MG posns No. 1 at a range of about 70 yards. The Sec Comd was still in heavy cover so he continued his advance to within 30 yds of the enemy MG, then he gave them a good squirt. That finished him - that posn had "had it" - it never fired again. While this action was in progress German MG No. 2 opened on the Sec Comd. He dealt with this second enemy gun from the same posn. The range of this action was approximately 120 yards. Note the "Wasp" was for one reason or other effective at this range.

F. Almost simultaneously with this action the sec 2 i/c was engaged by enemy MG No. 3. At a range of approximately 50 yards the Sec 2 i/c opened fire, immediately silencing that posn. He then continued to fire at withdrawing enemy up to maximum range.

G. At the same time as the Sec 2 i/c was completing phase II of his action the third carrier engaged the slit trenches in the centre of the enemy posn.

H. At this moment it was noticed that the enemy MG at posn No.4. had gone out of action and withdrawn.

I. There was no further movements or fire from the enemy position and B Coy continued its consolidation unmolested.

NOTE:

(a) In manouvering and choosing lines of adv in this action there was a ditch along B Coy's front which constituted a carrier obstacle.

(b) On action of the third carrier recce revealed that there were no bodies in the slit trenches fired on by this carrier. It is not known whether the enemy withdrew under cover of the smoke created or whether they sustained casualties. However, the result was most pleasing.

NOTES ON TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE "WASP" CARRIER.

1. The main feature of this weapon is that it is totally demoralizing. The enemy withdraws whether burned or not. The enemy, when engaged, ran SCREAMING. Therefore, it is essential that when possible, some small arms weapon get into a

"cut-off" posn. We suggest that this "cut-off" should be a carrier sec boldly handled and moving to a flank at speed and withdrawing to cover quickly. By using this manouver the enemy is destroyed in the same way as by a direct infantry attack when a pl or sec would work around to a flank and assault. The difference is speed which relieves the inf on the ground of the necessity of deploying for the flanking assault

2. Fire Support: It is the feeling of this Bn that "Wasps" should never be used singly or unsupported. Fire support is essential to allow the Wasps some freedom for manouver. If the inf on the ground are so pinned down that they cannot provide the necessary support, then it must come from some other source within the Bn

DRILL FOR THE USE OF THE "WASPS"

ESSENTIALS

1. Position in readiness where the Wasps and Carrier Pl Comd can RV and meet some one from the inf who can give information as follows:

- (a) Posn of enemy wpns and bodies on the ground.
- (b) Strength of enemy.
- (c) Posn of enemy right and left.
- (d) Posn of own troops.

2. Recce by Carrier Pl Comd.

3. Orders attended by a rep from inf on the ground.

TACTICS

4. Action by Pl Comd Carriers

- (a) Recce and plan.
- (b) Posn of enemy.
- (c) Posn of own troops.
- (d) Posn from which to fire and route to it.
- (e) Covering fire plan.
- (f) Cease firing rally for Wasps.
- (g) Posn of "cut-off" carrier sec and route to and from it.
- (h) Cease firing rally for carrier sec.
- (i) Signals

NOTE

The Pl Comd when planning must work out a signal to indicate that the "Cut-off" is in posn. When this signal is given the Wasps must at once commence their action.

5. ACTION BY INF

- (a) They must put as much fire on the enemy as possible in a covering role.
- (b) They must get up and assault frontally immediately the flame action commences. Puddles of flame are to be avoided.

As an alternative, the Bn 3" Mortar can provide a most effective cut off if the flanks are closed to manouver by enemy dispositions or the nature of the ground. In the same way MMGs in an enfilade posn are most useful in the cut off but a plan of this nature requires more time to set up.

6. The Willing Horse Must Not Be Whipped.

The inf got out of these holes before and they must not be allowed to think that the Wasp is the answer to all situations. Firstly, as the fuel capacity is most limited unless a fuel carrying veh is provided, the Wasp is useless in a War of Movements.....

3. ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF 6 CDN ARMD REGT (1 H) 14-16 AUG 44, GIVEN TO HIST OFFR.

1. On 14 Aug 44 the operation was launched which was designed ultimately to seize the high ground overlooking FALAISE and thus to dominate the potential escape route from the town which might be used by the German forces caught in the "pocket" to the WEST. The immediate task was the breaching of the enemy's defence line along the R LAISON, barring the approach to the objective. This first assault was to be accomplished by the tanks of 2 and 4 Cdn Armd Bdes, followed by the inf of 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes borne in armoured vehicles. The armour was expected to do little fighting on the river line itself (this being left to the troops of 9 Cdn Inf Bde immediately behind) but was to re-organize quickly in the valley and push on to the high ground beyond the river, in the area of point 184, square 1342. This feature was to be seized and held until relief was provided by 7 Cdn Inf Bde. The whole operation up to the seizure of the dominating ground was to be done under cover of smoke. Maj White described the assault as a sort of "draw swords and charge" affair.

2. With 10 Cdn Armd Regt on its right and with Flaiks, AVSRE and inf behind, the regt formed up on the start line NORTH of ESTREES LA CAMPAGNE and SOIGNOLLES. A Sqn on the right and C Sqn on the left were followed by RHQ, with B Sqn in immediate reserve. (See Appendix "A")

3. Precisely at 1200 hrs the leading sqns started forward on the dash to the river line. It was soon found that the country over which they were passing was very enclosed, with many hedges, sunken roads, and small woods. This, together with the fact that the smoke seriously reduced visibility, made it difficult to keep direction and the two forward sqns swung gradually left towards the area of 4 Cdn Armd Bde.

4. Many crews experienced difficulty in maintaining speed over the rough ground, for ammunition easily became damaged and some communication systems were put out of action. Any hesitation over a bump, moreover, was at once rewarded by determined attacks by enemy inf.

5. There can be no question that the smoke screened the advance from the A tk guns on the high ground beyond the river, but it did not aid in dealing with opposition close at hand, where it tended instead merely to blind tanks.

6. Both leading sqns now came under heavy enemy shelling. A tk gun fire and MG fire at very close range and had to fight their way forward by troops and even by individual tanks. The closeness of the fighting can be appreciated from the fact that the Sqn leader of C Sqn was killed by a hand grenade thrown into the turret of his tank, the driver alone

escaping. The sqn leader of A Sqn found his communication system out of order and his tank struck by an A tk gun, and was compelled to change vehicles under heavy MG fire.

7. As the tanks fought their way to the river line they found it to be an effective tank obstacle along its entire length, contrary to previous reports. In A Sqn 11 out of 19 were knocked out or bogged down in the stream and only four succeeded in crossing. The Commander of A Sqn, now in a second tank, became seriously mired and at such an angle that his guns were pointing into the swampy ground and could not be manipulated. Nevertheless although surrounded by enemy inf, he succeeded in keeping them at bay for about 45 mins, chiefly by firing 75 HE which exploded almost directly in front of his tank. At the end of this time our inf appeared and it was possible to begin recovery operations on this and other tanks bogged down. C Sqn encountered similar difficulties.

8. The balance of the regt, led by RHQ Tp, proceeded in almost a straight line from the start line to the Chateau, 143468. On reaching the high ground NORTH of the river, it was found that A and C Sqns had disappeared well off to the left, and that 10 Cdn Armd Regt was not in sight on the right. In its own sector, therefore, RHQ Tp was leading the advance, which became all too evident when it was fiercely engaged by enemy inf and supporting arms on all sides. Much good hunting was done at this time.

9. When this resistance had been overcome, the advance was continued towards the chateau. The 2 i/c meanwhile had moved off to the left to make a recce for a crossing which he eventually found at ROUVRES and which he was the first to use. Returning, he came upon a tp of C Sqn, which he directed over the bridge; B Sqn, the reserve sub-unit, then appeared and also went across intact.

10. At the Chateau, RHQ Tp circled to the right through the orchard at the rear, which was found to be heavily defended. At this time the leading sqn of 10 Cdn Armd Regt appeared, in the orchard and assisted by RHQ Tp shot up the area. It then moved off to search along the river for a crossing, confirming the fact that it was in the nature of an A tk ditch, holding 3' to 4' of water and with marshy ground on its far side. RHQ Tp of 6 Cdn Armd Regt less the 2 i/c and the CO, remained in the orchard to act as guides for other troops which might appear. A violent battle was now in progress as our inf attacked the Chateau, which was ultimately cleared.

11. The CO's tank, which had gone about 500 yds WEST, to the area of 10 Cdn Armd Regt's attempted crossing, made a very difficult turn on the steep bank but threw a track in the process. The crew got out and commenced repairs, the CO returning to the other two tanks in the tp to call up the AVsRE to construct a crossing. During this period RHQ was in touch with the 2 i/c and B Sqn who were now across the river, but had difficulty in communicating with A and C, so that it was not until some time later that their very considerable casualties were fully appreciated.

12. The bde comd now appeared and was informed of the situation. B Sqn was ordered to link up with 10 Armd Regt, who had at last succeeded in getting its RHQ and parts of two sqns across, and to continue the advance. RHQ of 6 Cdn Armd Regt then gathered together what stragglers it could and crossed the stream near the Chateau, where AVsRE had by now built a passage. Once over, it found the two tps of C Sqn without leaders. The remainder of A and C Sqns were regrouped to form a composite sqn.

13. In the meantime, B Sqn, which had crossed the LAISON at ROUVRES, from being in reserve, suddenly found itself the spearhead of the advance, owing to the confusion which had entangled A

and C in the river bottom. Without hesitation B Sqn was reorganized and prepared to push on over the high ground to the objective. Meeting extremely heavy A tk fire from immediately over the ridge in front of them, they had to draw back under its crest, having lost two tanks. During this first advance, however, a tp leader had accounted for three 88 mm guns.

14. As the sqn started forward again, our own arty laid down smoke, which fell right amongst the tanks. The vision of crew commanders and gunners was blocked out and the foremost tanks were silhouetted. The sqn drew back slightly, outflanked the smoke and went on, having suffered no losses. 10 Cdn Armd Regt on the right was not so fortunate, and two of its tanks were knocked out. B Sqn, continuing its advance, effectively dealt with two more 88 mm guns and a battery of four 105 mm guns.

15. Just short of its objective the tanks came once again under fire but this was quickly subdued. The enemy now laid a smoke screen on the left flank; the sqn immediately put down a very heavy concentration of MG and HE on the area of a hedge which proved to contain another battery of 105s. The objective -- to the left of the high ground at point 184 -- was reached shortly after.

16. B Sqn's performance was very creditable, particularly in view of the suddenness with which the situation changed for them. With the loss of only two tanks, their total confirmed bag amounted to eight 105 mm guns and six 88 mm guns, exclusive of any shooting done NORTH of the river.

17. The final objective, which was the commanding ground near PALAISE, was not reached until two days later, after several more battles. 6 and 10 Cdn Armd Regts arrived there on 16 Aug 44, tired and weakened, with their combined strength equal only to 2 sqns.

18. The fighting on the river bottom was the most hectic of the whole operation. Lt.Col.Colwell remarked that never had the regt killed so many of the enemy or thrown so many hand grenades. A Sgt of C Sqn, during that action, rounded up hundreds of PW, put them in charge of the Senior German officer, and directed them back through our lines until he met a major of the Provost Corps, to whom he delivered them all. The feat was done while the Sgt remained in his tank, though all its guns except the bow gun were out of action.

Lessons Learned:

(Note. The following remarks do not all relate specifically to the operation described above, but are the product of experience gained in many battles from 6 Jun 44 onward)

1. The armour is usually required to remain too long with the inf on the objective, even when seriously fatigued, and after dark when tanks are of no use. Release must be given as soon as possible so that the tanks can proceed to a forward rally to refill and repair, which requires a minimum of two to three hours with tired troops.

2. Impromptu smoke screens by the arty should be avoided in tank fighting. Tanks are easily blinded and there is danger of their being silhouetted against the smoke if it falls short.

3. The passage of information of every sort is vital. Exact location of our own troops, full details of the nature of terrain are most important. If it had been appreciated that the river line constituted so thorough a tank obstacle, AVsRE could have been placed well forward to prepare crossings and much precious time saved.

4. More time too must be given to ensure the passage of pertinent information to the crews themselves, so that they may be "put in the picture". It has occasionally been found that insufficient time was left even to arrange adequate communications with the inf.

5. The tactical handling of armour must be left to the armour. Dictation by the inf as to the placing and fighting of armoured sub-units is likely to prove both costly and eneffective.

4. ARMY SERVICE CORPS IN THE ASSAULT : MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH CAPT D.A. BRENNAN, ADJT, E.Q. R.C.A.S.C., 3 CDN INF DIV BY HIST OFFR, 11 AUG 44.

1. The assault on the coast of NORMANDY called for the creation of a number of special departments which could operate as soon as possible after the clearance of the beach area until such time as normal systems of supply could exist. Their purpose was to ensure a steady and rapid flow of ammunition and petrol to the inf. Lt.Col. J.R.W.T. Bessonette, CRASC, was in charge of all these special branches, which were subsequently merged into the normal Adm area.

2. Gun Areas - There were two gun areas. Each SP arty eqpt carried in addition to its own supply of 105 mm ammunition a considerable quantity of small arms ammunition and mines. These were dropped by the four fd regts at two prearranged points; one SOUTH of COURSEULLES and one near BANVILLE. Here the officer in charge, with the assistance of an NCO, was responsible for assembling the ammunition by types and advising the BRASCOS exactly where it was available. The gun area thus represented an intermediate point between the beach dumps and the inf.

3. Beach Ammunition Dumps - Two beach ammunition dumps, were set up, as the name implies, on the beach itself, where ammunition could be unloaded directly from the LCTs. It was then available either on immediate call by the inf, or for subsequent despatch to the Adm Area.

4. Report Centre - A report centre was established early in REVIERS, in order to direct inf back to the gun area or to the beach dumps. The officer in charge, acted as forward co-ordinator, linking the inf and the ammunition stores.

5. Trailer Park - 420 trailers 5 cwt had been loaded on craft of all sorts wherever space permitted. They carried petrol, small arms ammunition and mines. The intention was that certain wheeled vehicles on each craft should hook on a trailer, take it to the trailer park and drop it there. The trailer park thus formed, became a mobile store of petrol and ammunition, to answer immediate calls for replenishment. The trailers had merely to be run forward by the jeep platoon. A number of trailers were appropriated by persons unknown, as had been expected, but the scheme on the whole worked well. The trailers were separated as they arrived according to their contents (by petrol and types of ammunition), and the CRASC kept advised of quantities.

6. Jeep Platoon - The jeep platoon towed the trailers to forward areas; even the jeeps themselves were loaded. During the

early days of the op CRASC personally conducted jeep convoys bearing mines and ammunition to the front, sometimes even proceeding as far as platoon localities. The "ubiquitous jeep" gave further proof of its immense versatility: no better vehicle could have been found for the job.

7. Ammunition Co-ordinator - The ammunition co-ordinator, assisted the CRASC in an advisory capacity, keeping an accurate account of the state of ammunition holdings in the beach head. Later, when the Adm Area proper was formed he became responsible for the ammunition there.....

8. As routes became more suitable and as loads became greater during the build-up phase of the op, it was possible, as had been planned, to use this heavier transport to a greater degree. The 3-tonner pl is credited with being the first in the div to shoot down a German aircraft with small arms fire.....

9. On 8 Jun 44 the beach dumps, having served their purpose, were closed down, and the gun areas at BANVILLE was closed the next day. At the same time the gun areas near COURSEULLES was expanded into the Adm Area proper, and the ammunition from the beach dumps and the BANVILLE gun area was transported to the Adm Area dump.

10. An additional function was the recovery of enemy petrol and ammunition, when advised through 'Q' channels of their whereabouts.

5. AIR SUPPORT - MEMORANDUM BY HIST OFFR , 3 CDN INF DIV

(The following are the conclusions reached by Historical Officer, 3 Cdn Inf Div, after witnessing some aspects of our air attacks and having heard comments upon them by those most nearly concerned. It is hoped later to assemble opinions expressed by the troops themselves)

1. It would appear that most troops in the immediate target area of heavy bombers are in no condition to fight, even if they survive the experience. This is particularly true in the case of very large HE bombs. Men exposed to such attack are usually dazed ("bomb-happy") for a considerable period afterwards. A PW, who had been in the CAEN area when it was severely bombed on the night of 7 Jul 44, told an interrogator that he remembered little of the affair, having got up and run away aimlessly, ending up in a forward area where he was captured the following day. The average enemy soldier is impressed, and constantly uneasy lest he finds himself in an area being bombed..... The sight of wave upon wave of the vast machines, relentlessly sailing overhead, their bomb doors slowly opening, is close to sheer horror, to say nothing of the effect of the blast, the noise and the destruction.

2. The troops on the Waffen SS, however, are noted for their ability to withstand conditions which incapacitate most soldiers. In this connection, the writer recalls on 8 Jul 44, a PW of 12 SS Pz Div, who preserved the arrogant attitude characteristic of this group. Asked what he thought of the power of our air support, and in particular of the bombing carried out on the previous evening, he merely shrugged his shoulders and said "Nocht bei uns". This does not represent an isolated instance. It is clear then that such troops are not concerned with the mere threat of overwhelming air support, and may even be less affected by an actual attack.

3. An air attack on enemy positions produces a very noticeable moral effect on our own troops, whose spirits and enthusiasm are heightened immensely. For one thing the infantryman feels that his hardships are appreciated, and that he is not performing an utterly thankless task, since the enormous power of the air

force has been enlisted on his immediate behalf. The thought too that the opponent who has been mortaring and shelling him is now feeling the weight of a weapon much more terrible, acts as a tonic to his morale.

4. It is further emphasized that our troops are not blind to the possibility of errors being made and are therefore for the most part willing to view certain casualties and damage as part of the hazards of war, comparable to occasional errors in artillery calculations. On the other hand, anger is expressed at repeated mistakes, or at major blunders for which there is no reasonable explanation.

5. In the majority of cases the advance of our troops is facilitated. Infantry have reported finding the enemy lying dead in his slit trenches, and his guns and vehicles destroyed. Here again it should be noted that whereas until recently the major resistance to our advances has been offered by SS troops, these prized formations have not held the defensive line, but have been retained in the rear, the shock of the bombing and of the first infantry assault being borne by an inferior type of soldiery. Great care is taken to shield the SS from bombing by excluding them from likely target areas, so that they may be the fresher to engage in fighting.

6. The effectiveness of heavy bombing insofar as it eases our advance depends on the lapse of time between the air attack and the commencement of the ground operation. Whatever damage has been done it is of course possible for the enemy to introduce fresh troops into an area if sufficient time is given to him. The technique, now largely abandoned, of heavy bombing the evening previous to an operation, gives too clear an indication of our intentions.....

7. Even when almost total destruction of the enemy has been achieved, one obstacle to a swift advance frequently presents itself: roads may be cratered or heaped with rubble and thus made impassable. This situation was experienced by 8 Cdn Inf Bde in the COLOMBELLES area on 18 Jul 44. On that occasion comparatively minor resistance slowed the whole divisional advance, because the few roads available to by-pass the opposition were badly cratered.....

8. The work of the Typhoon Rocket Bombers has been most impressive, and extensive use has been made of them, particularly in the operations around CAEN. The Tentacle Liaison Officer of 1 Cdn Air Support Signals Unit at HQ 3 Cdn Div described this formation HQ as "air-minded".

9. Attacks by Typhoons are greeted with hearty approval by our troops. Their performance is most spectacular. It is usual for the artillery to mark the area with red smoke (a method which the enemy occasionally attempts to foil by laying down similar smoke within our positions). Typhoons then dive, one after another, at the target, adjusting their course by firing tracer cannon shells until hits are observed, following which the rockets are released, singly or all together.

10. On 27 Jul 44 the church tower at GARCELLES SECQUEVILLE was suspected of being an enemy OP. The artillery were unwilling to engage it, pointing out the great expenditure of ammunition entailed before it could be destroyed: air attack was suggested. Four Typhoons shortly engaged it with Rockets. When the attack was over, forward troops reported, "Church Tower no longer there".

6. MEDICAL SERVICES IN THE ASSAULT. MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
WITH COL. M. C. WATSON, ADMS, 3 CDN INF DIV, BY HIST OFFR.

1. For Op Overlord the Medical Services of 3 Cdn Inf Div had under command three field ambulances and one light field ambulance, four British field dressing stations, four British surgical teams, and two British transfusion units.
2. Sections of 14, 22 and 23 Cdn Fd Amb were put under command of the assaulting battalions and moved with them at the rear of Bn HQ. These sections thus landed in most cases about H + 30 mins. Each section comprised one MO and eighteen ORs, all on foot and carrying all their equipment. They followed the battalions to the first objective, nesting casualties on the way.
3. At the first objective the sections consolidated into companies and these were then placed in support of the brigades, in which manner they have worked ever since.
4. During the assault, one craft upset and several men were drowned. There were further casualties on the beach, but no fatality amongst MOs there. They were of course under fire and their work on the beach brought the DSO and 2 MCs to MOs and Mention in Despatches to two men.
5. Two advanced surgical centres were set up, each representing a combination of two FDS, two surgical teams and a transfusion unit. These centres, which were located at BERNIERES SUR MER and GRAYE SUR MER, less than a mile off the beach, were in operation and performing surgery by 2300 hrs on 6 Jun 44. Even before that an officer of a field surgical unit had taken over a wrecked LCV on MIKE BEACH, and transformed it into an operating theatre by 1600 hrs. During the early stages, casualties on or near the beach were collected in four Beach Dressing Stations, two on MIKE BEACH and two on NAN, and evacuated from there to the nearer advanced surgical centre. A British MO from one of the BDS organized a damaged LST as a hospital ward, holding about 90 patients, who were conveyed to other ships the following day, by DUKWs.
6. In the first four days the surgical teams performed about 220 major operations and handled in all about 1800 casualties. The two centres continued to function until about 19 Jun 44.
7. A Casualty Clearing Station landed on D day and opened at REVIERS on D + 2 (8 Jun 44). Until a site inland could be found which was free from snipers its personnel assisted the advanced surgical centres.
8. Evacuation of casualties by sea was sporadic during 6 and 7 Jun 44. On 8 Jun the first LST was beached, dried out and made available for casualties. It was loaded with over 300 men. From that day on LSTs and hospital carriers have been in regular service.
9. Evacuation by air was organized on 17 Jun 44. The first Dakotas left the landing strip at STE CROIX SUR MER, and the service was continued thereafter without interruption except during rainy weather. This system of evacuation had not been expected to be in operation so soon.
10. 14 and 22 Fd Ambs were operating at full scale on the morning of 7 Jun 44, the former at BANVILLE, evacuating casualties from 7 Cdn Inf Bde, and the latter at BENY SUR MER, serving 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes. 23 Fd Amb was in reserve.

-12-

11. The outstanding individual service has been done by the drivers of the ambulance jeeps who have often gone forward of the fighting troops under fire to pick up wounded, or have travelled to and fro over high ground under direct enemy observation. Casualties occurring one morning at BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE were aboard LSTs within 1½ hrs from the time of the incident. They had caught an ambulance convoy leaving the CCS and proceeded directly to the ships.

12. Medical personnel have frequently been exposed to enemy attacks; various medical installations have been bombed, mortared and sniped at. Ironically enough at an FDS situated at BERNIERES a bomb fell squarely on a tent filled with German PW, all medical orderlies.

13. The Red Cross has been respected by the enemy under normal circumstances, however, and a captured German MO advised setting out the giant Red Cross whether or not the medical establishments were 1000 yards from regular troops. It was explained that this distance has reference to artillery fire, not to strafing or day-bombing which may be avoided by proper marking of a site.


14. While casualties to medical personnel have been light, casualties to cars and tires have been very high. One driver lost three tires and a spare on one journey. There have been instances of direct hits on ambulance jeeps parked at RAPs.

15. Channels of evacuation have been fairly normal, except for Op Atlantic on 18 Jul 44, when the R ORNE was crossed NORTHEAST of CAEN. For this operation the plan was conceived of making use of DUKWs at selected points on the river. Unfortunately the arrangements for DUKW transport broke down and long lateral diversions to bridges over the river had to be followed. As a result of this experience it was felt that dependence on such special methods is unwise.

16. The system of Triage, whereby casualties are grouped into three categories and disposition made accordingly, has not been adhered to. Group 1 represents those seriously wounded and likely to die if sent on a long journey and these are to be despatched to Div FDS for resuscitation. Group 2 includes those requiring early operation, and such casualties are to be sent to an Advanced Surgical Centre or to a CCS. Group 3 consists of the lightly wounded, who are to be sent back to a CCS. In actual practice it has been found best to evacuate all casualties to a CCS as quickly as possible, lines of communication having been very short.


17. Fatalities amongst casualties once they are in medical hands have been very rare. The most impressive record is the speedy treatment of the abdominal cases on the beach on the night of D-day. All such casualties would have been fatal if early operations had not been performed.....

APPENDIX "A" (see Serial 1)
 Sketch Map to Illustrate Ops of S.D. & G Highrs 14/15 Aug 44.




LEGEND

Roads.....
 Rivers.....
 Churches.....



APPE "E" (see Serial 1)



LEGEND

Sketch Map to illustrate the
use of Flame Throwers by S.D.
& G. Highrs, 14 Aug 44.

Main Roads
Secondary Roads
Carriers
Route of Adv
Scrub
Enemy Slit Trenches
Enemy M.G.
Rivers
Orchards

