The Capture of U. Roatti

AS SEEN FROM A COY PACELL.

MANNE

150

Ref. Map. Italy 1:50,000 Shut 197-1 LANCIANO

FIt approx 0015 his night 5/6 Pec 43, A Coy PPCLI crossed the river MONO at map ref 325095, turned right and followed the river till coming to a muli track which led up the hill to the town of UROATTI- The Bn objective. After moving down the river for 300-400 yels, A long started up towards the town, following a mule track, Every M65 spened fire from the hill about us while we men still in the rim wally. Moring up the ring mally we were following B Coy and ahead of Cay. We soon Caught up to the tail end of B Coy and had a long wait till they overcame an MG post that had stopped turn. hieut J. G. Clarke, who evas shot in the throat was brought to A Coy 112, where his mound was dressed and he was then led back across the river. B Coy moved on up the hill and entered

The left (WEST) and of ROATTI. A wy followed to the top of the lill and then swang off to the right end of town. It was not yet day light and risibility was almost MIL. The leading Pl and risibility was almost MIL. The leading Pl Rozewas commanded by hiert R. Cany M.C.

object some 50 yets alead. The normal challenge was given but there was no reply. I few words of work were tried - still no reply, just then a motoragale came down the road from the other end of town - the rider shouting "A chtung". I hout half the Coy fired at him - he jumped off his like and disappeared in the darkness.

8Pl, led by Sqt. 6.5. Moore, went off to investigate a house that was showing a light. It had been occupied by the every and turned out to be HQ 5 (oy, ? Regt, 90 th hight Inf Pin (Sma). The occupants fled in the direction of 7Pl which was rounding up the Sermons who had failed to answer our challings. Some escaped in the darkness but 5 or 6 were captured. One of them, with his hands in the air, oudderly three a grenade and was properly shot in the foot. 849 Pls started promptly shot in the foot. 849 Pls started searching howers and ones and produced about 7 more prisoners.

Tay light was coming so P (poons were allotted and ligging in started. We were not sure of our exact location but brum we were in approx the right poon.

approx me many it started to get light the town 17s soon as it started to get light the town come under leavy motor fire. The motor fire suddenly lifted and Germans who had apparently crept up the lill under its cover,

his sections to pull out as it had run out of amn, and was then himself taken prisoner with 5 men from his pl. The remainder of his Pl, being out of amn hid in their shit trencues until theaction was over and were then able to come out.

At the time TPL evas attacked, Coy HQ came under MG fire and had to evacuate its poon.

8PL and gave covering fire while Coy HQ mound.

9Pl in the meantime was getting in some good shooting. Gpl H.J. Clocke did an excellent jobs with a Brun guin until he ran out of amn and was then forced to remain in his slit tinch.

8 Pl worked its way into poons from which they could engage the enemy with fire. From then on the enemy was unable to advance on change his poons.

Our supporting tanks arrived about 1/2 hrs after the counter attack started. The leading work count was shown the enemy poons and they were soon no line Germans left in the winning of ROATII (except prisoners).

One German, manning an M.G. oppred fix at the leading tank and hept firing until be was killed.

The post was then reorganized and starched. Teneral Germans were found hiding in laves and two ever picked up near Bn H. Q. A great deal of & erman equipment was collected incl MGS, rifles, wineless sets, telephones, 6-81 mm mortous, one 28/20 mm Athquing 3 motorcycles, dothing, blankets. It was apparent that the semans had word hack with the intention of story ing Apout from shelling, nothing much lappered until The middle of the afternoon. Our first counter attack had been quite a surprise but all ranks felt gruite confident that en could hold our poon against any further country attack. The first news of a second I iman attack came own the 18 set about the middle of the afternoon. A loy stood to unondering from which direction the attack come. We soon realized the attack was developing on our left in Blog area.

In this mould into poon and were soon engaging the every this a inf. A loy HQ was forced to more again as a tank AP shell came through our wouse and practically blinded us with dust. A long smoker screen appeared on our right and although nothing appeared on our right and although nothing came of it, we were expecting every to

come in from that flank. I loy was able to account for a comparatively small number of every but did get in some long range shooting. I herest of the long was fairly quint apart from shelling and internation to fine from the ridge in the area of JUBATTI. During the night 6/7 Dec, a great deal of every activity was board across the mally, incl sounds of diagging and tracked whiches moning. Jat Print 9 9 Pl took a small patrol to The bottom of the nally to investigate. He did not encounter any every but was able to tell us just about where they were. Our supporting Anty did some very good shooling on map ref largets and the every Could be heard screaming and yelling after some of the concentrations were fired. 8 Tec was spent cleaning up mod by ing

17 Pl, 17 Coy Come under command Floy that night and were used to strengthen our before. to slisence every movements in the JUBATTI area. The every shelled ROAITI, the wally of the MORO, and the Fech area most of the day.

hate in the afternoon the cost, the i Bn Royal Dest Kint Regt. came to see our poons. An "O"Sp was lild and orders recinid for a Dandouer to the RWK. The change over took place that night - A Coy being the last

arrived with the incoming coy. They didn't seem to mind the noise they mode. People The fact that the change our resembled a revenumental changing of he quand, it was successfully completed and A Coy was lubind the MORO at midnight.

De were all looking forward to a night's sleep but found ourselves "standing to" most of the night instead.

F. Coy. Statistics

Killed — 1

bounded — 16 (some muce NYD. N).


Captured — 6 (missing believed P.VV).

Estimated every billed - 20 Prisoners taken - 20 The Adjutant. May this he forwarded to Lt. Col bare as soon as possible Colin botton

LESSONS FROM ROATTI

1. The German will always return fine, even if he has no idea whe it came from. 2. Port he afraid of Berman outomalic fine at night v unless your sur one being lit. 9090 of the time the German fires even thought he has seen no 3. The German soldin has been tought to shouts
yell when he makes the final rush of an 4. Deman mortan fire will come down 100 or even Les less in front of his own troops. 5. / After Captuing a poon - outposts must probet the men uboare digging in. 6 You must have bookouts during leavy mortaine or shelling - it may be the pulsade to an attach.

7. Demans do use smoke to take attention away from FUP's. 8. Sermons to pull the trick of parently our ending list throwing a genade when you get rear them? I ba Jerry wants to surender - make him come 9. DF should be registered before a poon is attacked. belek batsonman



On the 5th Dec 43, the Bn was situated on the reverse slope of the high ground across the Moro River valley from the town of Val Roatti.

Numerous recce patrols from the Bn had been down in the river valley all through the day.

At 1700 hrs, Capt R.F.S. Robertson, O.C. "B" Coy, detailed No. 12 Platoon Comdr to take a recce patrol across the river Moro tofind a route in to the town up which the Bn could move to attack. The patrol left the Coy area at 1730 hrs. It was a bright moonlit night and visibility was good. On reaching the river a suitable crossing place was found and the patrol moved to the right, finding a mule track. The mule track led up the draw into the right end of town, on the left side of the draw. About half-way up to the town there was a track junction where a track led off to the left into the centre of town. The patrol passed this junction and carried on along the track leading into the right end of the town. When in the out-skirts of town the patrol observed a group of three of the enemy moving against the skyline. They disappeared and a few minutes later were heard approaching along the track toward the patrol. At the same time the sound of hammering or digging was heard and seemed to come from the right and across the draw. The patrol withdrew and returned to the Bn area. The patrol Comdr was called to Bn H.Q. and gave the information.

O.C. "B" Coy called 'O' Group at 2230 hrs and gave information regarding the attack which was to be made by the Bn that night. "B" Coy was to lead and was to take the town. The Coy was to be in position at edge of river by 2330 hrs and was to cross at 2400 hrs. Artillery was to in lay down 1780 rds on the town between 2345 hrs and 2400 hrs.

The Coy left it's area at 2300 hrs, getting into position at edge of river by 2330 hrs. The barrage did not materialize and the Coy crossed the river at 2400 hrs led by No. 12 Platoon. It moved up the mule track, passed the track junction and was within some 10 yards of where the Recce patrol had been when fire was opened by an enemy M.G. on the left and above. This fire was not effective as the ground on the left of the track rose steeply and afforded good cover. The night was very black by this time, the moon having gone down at about 2315 hrs. The Coy Comdr ordered 12 Platoon to take me this M.G. post. The Platoon was getting into position to deal with the post when fire was opened by an M.G. on the right, across the draw. This fire forced the Coy down onto the track. Several of our own L.M.G.'s returned fire - firing at the flash. Pte Nixon opened fire with his 2" Mortar, firing low-angle and scoring hits quite close to the post.

Lieut J.G. Clarke, No. 11 Platoon, was wounded through the throat when he fired at the enemy with his Tommy-gun. Pte Morris, C. was killed while using his Bren-gun. The M.G. probably fired at the flash made by **tkis/weapons. their

The Coy Comdr withdrew the Coy to the track junction and moved up the left track. The Coy was now under cover from the M.G. on the right but was exposed to the M.G. which had been on the left. The flash from this gun was seen and the Coy left the track, moving up towards the post. The gun fired continuously but the fire was high over. When withing some 20-30 yards of the enemy he threw grenades, they caused no damage. The Coy formed up to assault and after throwing grenades at the post, rushed the position. The M.G. remained silent and the enemy manning the gun were taken prisoner, two men.

Cpl Zroback, 12 Platoon, took his section to the left to look for another post. They came upon another M.G. and heard the mechine-gunner trying to cock his gun. The post was knocked out with grenades.

The Section returned and the Coy proceeded up the hill and through a vineyard into the square of the town.

Once "B" Coy was in the town, "A" Coy passed through it proceeding to the right front edge.

"B" Coy had taken up positions and patrols proceeded to look for snipers. Fire came from all directions and mopping up took until about 0000 hrs. The Coy had entered town about 0545 hrs.

A number of prisoners were taken. For the most part, they seemed to be quite surprised to walk into the patrols. Evidently most of them had been asleep in the houses and had not realized that the town had been captured.

The Bn Scouts & Snipers came up and seemed to have good shooting.

The C.O. went out along a road running through the town with Capt Robertson and saw a group of the enemy forming up for a counter-attack. The counter-attack was directed at "A" Coy on the right.

"B" Coy took up positions in defence of the left half of town. Sgt Demmy, commanding 10 Platoon, occupied a house on the road. which the C.O. had seen the enemy forming up. From this position he overlooked "A" Coy and his Platoon got in some good shooting.

No. 12 Platoon occuppied houses in the left end of the town and No. 11 Platoon took up positions in a vineyard on the left of town. 11 and 12 Platoons were able to do only a little sniping. The ground in front of the Coy offered good cover to the attackers. The arrival of 5 Sherman tanks finally faused the enemy to withdraw. The tanks arrived at about 0930 hrs.

10 Platoon ran very short of ammunition by the time the enemy withdrew, having started the attack with 50 rds per man and 8 mags per gun.

Ammunition was brought up at soon as possible by mule-train. A road ran left of the square and turned right in front of 12 Platoon before turning left again. The distance between the two bends in the road in front of 12 Platoon was roughly 50-60 yards. A group of buildings stood at the end of the stretch where the road turned left. These buildings were manned by a section led by Cpl Zroback.

The second counter-attack came in from the left along this road about 1415 hrs. The attacking force was composed of 5 Mk IV Special tanks; 2 S.P. guns and roughly a Coy of Infantry. possibly a little stronger.

A recce patrol led by Cpl Martins had gone out along this road at about 1330 hrs to investigate a group of buildings some 800-900 yards. Ptes Gusul and Arne were taken prisoners but Cpl Martins and Pte Bangle made a run for the Coy position and were successful.

Fire was opened by the approaching tanks from the vicinity of the group of buildings. This first fire was directed at a Sherman tank which was in position in front of the houses manned by Cpl Zroback's section. The Sherman was knocked out and the houses behind, manned by the section, were subjected to M.G. fire and H.E. and A.P. fire. The Coy Comdr was in the vicinity of the buildings and ordered the section out and into alternative positions.

One of the enemy tanks was knocked out by fire from the Bn Anti-Tank guns across the valley.

The attacking force split into two groups immediately after having opened fire. Three tanks, with infantry, swung off the road to the left and through an olive grove making for the positions occupied by 10 Platoon.

The remaining tanks, with infantry, swung off the road to the right making for 11 Platoon commanded by Cpl Whittaker, and for 12 Platoon. Cpl Whittaker ran forward from his position with the P.I.A.T. and two bombs trying to get to a position from which he could fire at the oncoming tanks. He scored hits on the tanks with both bombs but they were faulty and failed to explode.

This tank was knocked out finally by fire from a Sherman tank. The three tanks making for 10 Platoon positions were also knocked out by fire from our Shermans. Before they were knocked out, however, two of them had gotten to within 75 and 100 yards of the position and had subjected the house to very heavy fire with both H.E. and A.P. Sgt Demmy held on as long as possible but was finally forced to leave the house and take up a position on the ground.

Cpl Davis of 10 Platoon, took up a position in front of the Sherman tanks which was on the road in front of the house. He was responsible for directing fire from the Sherman which knocked out one of the enemy tanks.

The infantry occampanying the tanks deployed when close to the town and tried to infiltrate. They were met by such kx heavy and accurate fire from Bren-gun and rifles that they were forced back a number of times.

Each time they fell back, they re-organized and came in again. One section, roughly, gained entry into the houses in front of 12 Platoon but were trapped there. 10 Platoon covered doors and windows in rear and 12 Platoon the doors and windows in front. Some number of this group were killed as they tried to cross the bend in the road to get to the house. A white flag was eventually waved from the door-way and three of the enemy came out and walked towards 12 Platoon position. They were met by Capt R.F.S. Robertson in the alley-way and brought in to one of the houses occupied by the platoon.

ll Platoon held off a group of the enemy trying to outflank their position. They were in great danger of being over-run but held the position, killing many of the enemy. Cpl Whittaker's leadership and example did much to make the Platoon hold, as the situation was extremely grave.

The enemy did not make the best use of cover, coming into open when good cover was available.

Pte Buck, J.J. had a post on the second floor of the building, overlooking ll Platoon's position. He saw one of the enemy about 300 yards away, exposing himself, from the waist up, behind a pile of rocks. Buck, J/J. fired six rds at this target. The German ducked after each shot only to expose himself again and again until killed with the sixth shot. He could have had the same observation from a hedge-grove some 5 yards behind the rock pile. At one point, a German tried to run, upright, a distance of some 20 yards to cross the road in front of the Coy. He ran straight into a busst of fire from the Bren-gun and was brought down. The next man attempted the same thing and was also brought down. There was excellant cover from view afforded by a hedgerow running right up to the road.

After about the fifth attempt to get into the town had failed, the enemy withdrew, leaving 5 damaged tanks behind

During the evening, at about 1900 hrs, one of the tanks blew up, probably a German demolition party had returned to do the job.

Our own artillery support was brought down very close to the Coy positions, during 2nd counter-attack. Some of the shells falling within the Coy area.

The night was uneventful except for enemy shelling between 2100-2400 hrs.

Capt R.F.S. Robertson was wounded the next day, around 0900 hrs on the 7 Dec 43, when he was investigating the houses in front of the Coy position. He thought that some men from the Coy had been within one of the houses when it had been hit by a shell, causing the roof to cave in. As it happened, no one had been within.

Capt C.M. MacDougall took command of the Coy, around 1200 hrs. The Bn was relieved by the ?th R.W.K. at 1830 hrs on the 7 Dec 43 and returned by to the position it had formerly occupied across the Moro River.

Note: - First light - 0545 hrs.

Last Light - 1730 hrs.

Moon Full - Set - 2315 hrs.

Minus on approx only, in the above maris five.

o Coy. P.P.C.L.1.