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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

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OTTAWA, Ontario.,

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Lt-Col., G.S.

for Chief of the General Staff.

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S E C R E T

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24/AEF/1/4 (Hist)

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DIARIES AND MEMORANDA

(SERIES 19)

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1. A COMPANY ATTACK ACROSS THE MAAS: OPERATION "SCHULTZ", 17 JAN 45 (ACCOUNT BY LT.-COL. R.A. KEANE, O.C. LAKE SUP R (MOT), GIVEN TO HISTORICAL OFFICER, 4 CDN ARMD DIV, 18 JAN 45). (Sketch Map Attached)

1. Op "SCHULTZ" was a daylight op of coy strength mounted for the purpose of establishing the identity of the enemy holding the NORTH bank of the R MAAS opposite the Bn front.

2. The intentions of the enemy in this sector of the front, i.e., from incl KERKDRIEL 3455 through HOENZADRIEL 3353 and HEDEL 2852 to incl AMMERZODEN 2652, were not known. He had not been over-active since the Bn had assumed the responsibility for this sector, limiting his efforts to sporadic mortar, MG, and SA fire into GEWANDE 3553, EMPEL 3251, GREVECOEUR 2951, and BOKHOVEN 2751, and to small and infrequent recce patrols. The latter had, on occasion, infiltrated our posns, where they had remained for a period of up to 24 hrs. His strenght on our immediate front was estimated to be a bn plus.

3. Our intention was to assault NORTH across the MAAS to attack the village of HOENZADRIEL, and to capture alive two or more PsW, the assault coy to return when two PsW had been captured. "A" Coy was assigned this task and was withdrawn from the river bank, where it had been operating in a holding role, on 16 Jan, in order properly to organize the attack. "A" Coy had been engaged in patrol activity in the sector for some days, had sent recce patrols across the MAAS during darkness to the point of intended penetration (344536), and had contacted the

enemy there. An extensive sp programme had been laid on by the armd regts, two fd and one med regts, two MG pls, and the mortar pl of LAKE SUP R (MOT). Diversions were arranged as follows: "B" Coy to fire from WILD in sq 3654, and from the point of embarkation at GEWANDE 3553; "D" Coy to fire from EMPEL in sq 3251, and FORT CREVECOEUR 2951. One MG pl was stationed at 337518, and second at 350528; the mortar pl had its posn at 342519.

4. The plan for the attack was as follows: one pl to cross the MAAS directly opposite GEWANDE and to establish a brhd of approx 100 x 150 yds; the second to follow immediately the brhd pl became waterborne and to pass through the first to consolidate and to establish a firm base on the rd juncs 343535, 340536, and 342537; the third, or assault pl, to embark as soon as the firm base pl entered their boats, cross the river, pass through the brhd and firm base pls, turn SOUTH WEST into HOENZADRIEL, and there to capture PsW.

5. During the actual period of the crossing, smoke was to be laid on and the area isolated. The MG pl and the "B" Coy diversionary party in the area GEWANDE were to provide immediate covering fire. The mortar pl, with one OP at GEWANDE and a second at EMPEL, was prepared to take on any opposing fire either during or after the crossing. Once the firm base was established, the mortar pl (342519) and the MG pl at 337518 were to seal off the WEST end of the village at 337531. Once the objective was reached, the assault coy was to withdraw in the reverse order, i.e., assault pl, firm base pl, and brhd pl.

6. The tk sp fire plan was as follows: 21 Cdn Armd Regt to fire on KERKDRIEL; 28 Cdn Armd Regt less one tp on the rd running from 349547 to 347537, and with one tp on the factory at 358545; and 22 Cdn Armd Regt to fire on the rd running from 318527 to 305529. The armd regts were to fire at the rate of 3 rpg per minute from H-5 to H+5, then change to salvos at the rate of one rd per five minutes. The latter part of this programme was to continue until the withdrawal, at which time the rate was to be stepped up to 3 rpg per minute.

7. The arty sp fire plan called for stonks of HE by 68 Cdn Med Regt (Scale 2) on 33655320 and by two btys of 23 Cdn Fd Regt at Rate 3 on 34245350 - 31695305 by one bty of 19 Cdn Fd Regt and (b) on the churches at KERKDRIEL 34905539 - 34905539 - 34565504 by one bty of 23 Cdn Fd Regt, while (c) one bty of 19 Cdn Fd Regt brought down smoke and HE intermittently on HEDEL and AMMERZODEN. This programme was timed for H-5 to H+5.

8. From H+5 to H+10 two btys of 23 Cdn Fd Regt were to fire a stonk (Scale 3) on 34205380; at H+8 68 Cdn Med Regt were to fire HE at Scale 1 on the church at 32235520; at H+15 on an enemy bty at 34095372, and at H+20 on a second enemy bty at 26305588. One bty of 23 Cdn Fd Regt was to fire HE on Scale 2 into the bldg at 31755443 at H+20, while at the same time one bty brought down HE on the same scale on the X rds 33645460. At H+25 the Med Regt was to fire HE (Scale 1) on the enemy bty at 25825576. During this programme air OPs were to fly continuous sorties over the area.

9. "A" Coy was organized for the assault in four waves: Nos (1) and (2) brhd and firm base pls; (3) Coy HQ, incl one CAP boat and one boat for reserve man, and (4) the assault pl. The latter was organized in four secs so that two secs could work simultaneously on each of the two parallel streets which made up the village of HOENZADRIEL. All tps, FOOs, and others required forward for this Op were moved into GEWANDE under cover of darkness during the night 16/17 Jan 45. Coy Rear HQ was to operate at GEWANDE.

10. Eqpt:

The brhd pl was provided with snow suits as they were to take up posns in enemy slit trenches in the open and on snow-covered ground. Leather jerkins were provided for the firm base pl, camouflage jackets for the assault pl, in order to provide for easy identification within the Coy and from the SOUTH bank of the MAAS. Shovels were allocated to the brhd and firm base pls on a scale of one per two men.

11. Weapons:

The brhd pl was armed with two 2" mortars, six .30 Brownings on ground mounts and one PIAT with six rds. The firm base pl was similarly armed save that it had three PIATs and only three Brownings. The assault pl was armed with three Brens in place of the Brownings, three LIFE-BUOY flame throwers, and No 36 and No 80 grenades. Each man carried his rifle, a machine carbine, or a Bren.

12. Med:

One Sgt and four SBs were allotted to the CAP beat. The Sgt was to remain at the brhd, while the four SBs were to operate from the firm base. Two jeeps amb and one med half-track formed the CAP at GEWANDE.

13. Intercomm:

Five No 38 sets were provided, two with the assault pl, one with the firm base pl, one at Coy HQ, and one at the brhd. One No 19 set on a stretcher was allotted to the firm base pl. One weighted and one free line were carried across by boat, and a third was to have been rocketed across. Flare sigs were laid on in case of the failure of other comms.

14. Zero Hour:

H Hour was set for 171230 hrs.

15. When the arty opened up at H-5 hours the brhd pl left the shelter of the bldgs at GEWANDE, made the necessary carry of approx 50 yds, and launched as scheduled. As soon as this pl was on the water the firm base pl, with Coy HQ, followed. No 3 Sec of No 2 Pl met with a boat accident and were unable to cross. The assault pl entered the water at the moment the brhd pl touched ground on the far bank. The actual crossing took from three to five minutes.

16. The brhd pl met with no opposition whatsoever and quickly deployed in GERMAN slit trenches on the high ground commanding the dyke. The two secs of the firm base pl which made the crossing passed through and reached the ditch running EAST and WEST at 344533 when they were pinned down by SA fire from the area of the dyke in front of them and from HOENZADRIEL to the LEFT. This pl was at this point about 200 yds from the river. The time was approx 1235 hrs. The assault pl passed through the brhd on schedule, but when they saw the firm base pl pinned down by fire from the LEFT they swung RIGHT and made for the rd at 344536.

17. Just as the firm base pl was pinned down, Maj E J O GRAVELLE, the Coy Comd, became a cas and was evacuated. (1) Lt H K BIRD, who was in comd of the brhd pl, immediately took over. Capt BURKE, the Coy 2 i/c was at Coy Rear HQ at GEWANDE. On receiving the word that Maj GRAVELLE had become a cas, Lt Col KEANE came forward from Bn Tac HQ at ROOSMALEN 3649 to GEWANDE. Seeing the show going well, but bogged down due to intense automatic fire from the village and from the dyke rd to the RIGHT in the area 347537, Lt Col KEANE suggested to Capt BURKE that the firm base pl should disengage and assist the assault pl on the RIGHT where the going appeared to be a little easier. Once this disengagement had taken place, it would then be possible, to use the arty on the village and rd junc -- the sources of the greater part of the enemy fire. The assault pl was by this time also pinned down by fire from the a/m dyke rd.

18. Capt BURKE passed instrs to this effect to Lt BIRD, and the firm base pl was able to disengage without difficulty under the cover of arty. Meanwhile, the assault pl had crossed the dyke under smoke from No 8 Grenades and cleared two houses. No enemy were met with at this point, however, so the pl turned to the dyke itself and succeeded in capturing three PsW from the pit dug under the near slope of the dyke. At this point the firm base pl arrived on the scene.

19. As the objective of the attack had been won, the Coy began to withdraw at once. The firm base pl covered the withdrawal of the assault pl and its PsW to the brhd. The Coy withdrawal then took place according to plan under the cover of a smoke screen which had been put down in the area 330528 to 347527. The time was then about H+90. The return took approx 30 minutes, the whole force reaching the SOUTH bank at 343527 at 1430 hrs.

(i) At this time two lines were in operation: the 19 set back to Bn Tac HQ and the 38 set which provided contact between Coy HQ and the OP at GEWANDE.

20. With the return of the Coy and Op was completed. More than the minimum of PsW had been captured, and valuable infm secured from them provided important additions to our knowledge of the enemy order of battle in this sec of the NORTH bank of the MAAS. "A" Coy suffered four cas: the OC Coy, who was wounded in the brhd, and three cas in the assault pl, one in the brhd, and two at the dyke shortly before the capture of the PsW.

Comments

21. Enemy Reaction

The enemy reaction to the attack was very slow save for intense but somewhat misdirected automatic fire. The Op had been over for nearly an hour before there was any mortaring on GEWANDE. There was, however, some mortaring on EMPER and GREVECOEUR during the show. This failure on the part of the enemy to react quickly seems to have been due in the first instance to the element of surprise, but primarily to the intense supporting fire from the armd regts on KERKDRIEL and the rds leading thereto.

22. Reasons for the success of the attack:

The element of surprise, the intensive supporting fire, and the perfection of the smoke screens provided, are the prime reasons for the success of the Op.

Lessons Learned

23. The mounting of such an Op in daylight was decided upon for two primary reasons: (1) to achieve surprise and (2) to provide for effective control of the actual crossing. It had been the previous experience of the Coy that it was almost impossible to keep boats together and a force intact during a night crossing.

24. With sufficient fire power, good planning, and detailed recce, an attack is almost bound to succeed so long as control can be maintained.

25. Flexibility is essential. Every plan must be simple and easily subject to change.

26. A Pl assigned to a brhd role is better equipped with Brownings than with Brens as the former are capable of a greater sustained rate of fire and do not involve a long amn carry.

27. The equipping of the pls with different dress proved eminently useful from the control standpoint as well as from that of the men themselves. They were easily able to distinguish members of their own pl, the two other pls and the ground dis-posns of each.

28. An exact duplicate of, or even a more intricate HQ than that sent across must be maintained on the near bank. Amn and eqpt should be dumped near the river with spare boats and men readily available to tpt them to the brhd without placing extra strain on the resources of the force comd on the spot. It was found that one additional pl on the near bank is necessary for adm purposes. In this instance this pl was sup by "B" Coy which was then garrisoning GEWANDE.

29. Good intercomm is a MUST as far forward as the assault secs. If good, as it was in this case, the man who needs it most is the man who calls down the arty. It also enables the Comd to assess the battle at any given time. During Op "SCHULTZ" there was never more than five minutes during which the CO was not fully in the picture. It is to be emphasized, however, that the elaborate comm with which an armd bde is supplied makes the comm problem in such an op relatively easy.

30. The No 19 set is rather cumbersome for use beyond the brhd until the firm base is definitely established. Both the weighted and the ordinary lines which were sent across by boat worked admirably. In the latter case the lack of current probably explains its success. The use of the rocket to throw a line across an obstacle is successful with the line attached up to 150 yds. In this case, as the MAAS is approx 200 yds wide at GEWANDE, a rope should have been used with the rocket and the line drawn across afterwards.

31. The participants in the attack learned once again the essential lesson that when arty is called for, movement must take place as soon as fire is brought down on the target. The fact that the firm base pl moved as soon as the arty was brought down on the dyke rd and the village accounts for its successful disengagement.

2. A FIGHTING PATROL CROSSES THE MAAS (MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY LT W A GODEFROY, OC NO 15 PL, ALQ R, TO HISTORICAL OFFICER 4 CDN ARMD DIV - 26 JAN 45). (Sketch Map Attached)

1. On 19 JAN 45 "A" Coy ALQ R held a coy area along the SOUTH bank of the R MAAS from incl HEESBEEN 1951 to incl DOEVEREN 1750. "C" Coy had previously held this area, but was then in res at ELSHOUT 2048. The enemy opposite had not been active for some days although there had been some light mortar and SA fire on the "A" Coy area. He was known to be entrenched along both sides of the dyke-rd running EAST - WEST approx 200 yds back of the NORTH bank of the MAAS between N 20 and 19.

2. Our intention was to capture and destroy any enemy contacted along the dyke EAST and EAST of the track and dyke junction at 192523.

3. Our plan was as follows: No 15 Pl, with a str of one offr and 22 ORs, to start from MR 195514, to cross the MAAS with No 8 Sec on the RIGHT, Pl HQ and No 7 Sec in the CENTRE, and No 9 Sec on the LEFT, and to land in the area 194519. From

this point the Pl was to follow a fence line running from the river bank to the dyke in a NORTH-WESTERLY direction. This fence line was to be our RIGHT bdy, the a/m bridge our LEFT. After forming up on the NORTH bank, we were to adopt a rough diamond formation with No 9 Sec on the LEFT, No 8 on the RIGHT, Pl HQ in the CENTRE, and No 7 at the Rear. As soon as we reached the top of the dyke Nos 8 and 9 Secs were automatically to exploit to the RIGHT and to the LEFT. The res sec with Pl HQ and the two Brens from Nos 8 and 9 Secs were to form the firm base. As soon as a sec succeeded in capturing PSW it was to withdraw through the firm base. Allowing this Sec some two minutes to make its way back to the boats, I then intended to give a whistle sig to withdraw the remaining sec. The withdrawal of the Pl less one sec, which would be presumed to have gone forward, would then take place.

4. Hy sp was provided for this exercise by two fd regts, and 1 regt of 7.2s, by 4.2" and 3" mortars, two MMG pls, and by LMGs and SA fire from "A", "B", and "D" Coys. The 4.2" mortars were to fire concs without call between H and H+30 hrs along the dyke line which follows the HEUSDENSCH KANAAL. Between H and H+15 hrs six 3" mortars were to fire on the WEST end of the HEUSDENSCH KANAAL. Four were to continue on this target for a further 15 minutes, while the remaining two laid down smoke opposite HEUSDEN. One-half of one MMG pl was given a task which called for fire directly NORTH along the 19 grid line then LEFT on an arc which was to include GENDEREN 1751. The remaining half of the Pl was to cover from GENDEREN to the grid line. The second MMG pl was to fire on the area from incl AALBURG 1953 to incl NEDERHEMERT 2254. "A", "B", and "D" Coys were to maintain fire to the immediate front of their coy posns, while "A" and "D" Coys, with their mortars bded, were to fire diversionary smoke at extreme ranges opposite DOEVEREN and HEDIKHUIZEN 2351 respectively.

5. The fd regts were assigned "call" targets as follows: one fd regt, HE or smoke and HE on the dyke running EAST - WEST in the 20/19 grid lines and from approx 200 yds to the LEFT to No 18 grid Line and back to GENDEREN; the second, HE or smoke and HE on the rd from GENDEREN to AALBURG. The 7.2s were to fire on NEDERHEMERT between H and H+20 hrs.

6. Eqpt:

Three assault boats were used in the exercise. Each man wore black face, a beret or balaclava, a leather jerkin, battle dress, rubber boots, and a web belt with two No 36 and one No 80 Grenades.

7. Wpns:

The disposn of wpns was normal. Each sec was armed with two stens, one Bren and three rifles.

8. Meds:

One stretcher was carried, but was left in a boat by plan.

9. Intercomn:

Intercomn was by runner and R/T. Pl HQ was equipped with one No 18 set. Two code sigs were laid on, one to indicate that our objective had been reached, the second to indicate our withdrawal.. Five minutes after this sig was passed, one fd regt was to bring down a 5-minutes conc on the objective.

Narrative:

10. The pl left its SP at H-5 and launched on schedule. On the way across we ran into a squall and some very rough water. At approx the half way point I called for arty on our objective. The crossing took nearly 12 instead of the 7 minutes we had planned for. All boats landed simultaneously. We spent approx one minute forming up, then began our advance. When we were approx half way across the open field which lies between the river and the dyke, the arty came down, but nearly 100 yds short of the target. The pl was completely pinned down and without adequate cover. I gave the sig to pull out, and the secs managed to reach a ditch which gave them meagre cover. The arty let up after 5 minutes. I then rallied the pl and we moved forward, the plan working splendidly. When we reached the dyke I followed No 9 Sec part way to the LEFT and watched the sec cmd flush what appeared to be a dugout in the dyke. This dugout was empty, however, and as the sec moved off to the LEFT I returned to our firm base to check on the progress of No 8 Sec. I had just reached the firm base when I heard shouting from No 9 Sec and one man goading a Heinie forward. This sec passed about 25 yds away. I called to ask if they had secured PsW and was told that they had two. I gave the sec approx two minutes lee-way to get to the boat, then blew the sig for our withdrawal. No 8 Sec came in very quickly, having exploited up to approx 150 yds without contacting any enemy. At the river bank I ordered the Pl Sgt to check each boat, and each reported its complement complete. The withdrawal to the SOUTH bank was without incident but there was one stretch of very rough water.

11. Immediately upon our return I reported to the Coy Comd that the patrol had returned with two PsW and no cas. At this point a runner came in to report that G.56372 Cpl CARRIER, K.J., the Cpl i/c No 9 Sec and one of his men were missing. A few moments later a call came in from "A" Coy to the effect that the missing men were located. The Coy Comd despatched the pl to billets, while I started off for an "A" Coy Bren posn on the dyke with my Pl Sgt and Sigm to see if the men could be seen in the water. At the posn I learned that Cpl CARRIER was safe but that L.107081 Pte KLEIN had been lost. With Lt GRANDBOIS and my Pl Sgt I went down to the river to see if the body could be recovered. We found it shortly afterwards, face downwards in the water. We removed the body at once and tried artificial respiration. This effort was without success. The MO found later that Pte KLEIN had died of shock.

Lessons Learned

12. In an exercise of this type arty should be called for a good five minutes before it is required.

13. Our experience in the open under hy shell fire proved that men can actually live in such fire by keeping well down.

14. Each sec employed in such an exercise must report individually on the withdrawal to the boats.

15. Absolute obedience to the orders of the sec comd is completely essential. An exercise of this type, especially at night, is largely the sec comd's show and he must be obeyed to the letter of his comds.

16. The formation and the camouflage adopted for this exercise both worked very well indeed.

Comments

17. The enemy:

Our exeperience in this exercise confirms the fact that Jerry is very much afraid of our arty. In this case he appears to have deserted the deep comm trenches in the immediate area and to have conc in one concrete pill box.

Own Troops

My own men, nearly 25% of which were new recruits from various ord units, fitted in like old soldiers and behaved magnificently throughout. The work of Cpl CARRIER and Pte KLEIN is worthy of the highest praise.

3. OPERATION "PAUL", A COMPANY RAID IN THE WYLER AREA, 23 Jan 45
(A REPORT PREPARED BY HQ 9 CDN INF BDE, 26 JAN 45 AND
FORWARDED BY HISTORICAL OFFICER, 3 CDN INF DIV).
(Sketch Map attached)

Op "PAUL"

1. Object

To secure a PW.

2. Factors affecting the attainment of the object

- (a) Areas 4 (777582) and 5 (776574) were those from which a PW was required. These lay at a distance of 1000 and 1500 yds respectively from our FDLs and lay within a definite trench system of a linear type which was protected by outposts at night.

Deduction

A definite "bite" must be taken out of the enemy posn which was relatively close to our FDLs.

- (b) Good observation was available over both areas from our FDLs

Deduction

Observed fire could sp the attack.

- (c) Five or six inches of snow covered the ground.

Deduction

White snow suits would greatly assist the concealment of our troops. Direction would be difficult to maintain at night.

- (d) The posns were thought to be protected by mines and booby traps and flares.

Deduction

Experience has proved that these are avoidable in daylight but dangerous at night.

- (e) A raid had been carried out by the N Shore R in carriers at approx one hr before last lt 10 days previously for the same purpose and in the same area.

Deduction

This time of the day was likely to be an alert time for the Germans.

- (f) All activity appears to subside in the enemy posns about one hr after first lt.

Deduction

This time should be suitable for attack.

- (g) Each of these localities was thought to contain a pl in str.

Deduction

The force should be at least double the str of the enemy.

- (h) Observation by the enemy is possible in daylight on both objectives and on the approaches thereto.

Deduction

Smoke must be used to blind the enemy observers.

- (i) Enemy fixed lines of fire from both MGs and mortars must NOT be allowed to fall on these objectives and approaches.

Deduction

The fire plan must be designated to "Squash" all such fire.

- (j) Escape is possible in comm trenches from these posns.

Deduction

The fire plan must "pin" and cut off posns thus preventing enemy from escaping.

3. Preparation

- (a) C Coy Nth NS Highrs was detailed for the aslt on the right to Area 5 and 17 pl Nth NS Highrs for the left to Area 4. For the three successive nights prior to the raid recce patrols were sent out to Area 4, K house 77055779, Xrds 77235770, and to Area 5. The object of these patrols was to determine the disposition, the str, and degree of alertness of the enemy, to find the most suitable approaches to the posns and to pin pt minefds, booby traps, trip flares, etc.,
- (b) Detailed observation and recce of the whole area concerned was made by the Bde, Bn and Coy Comds and CRAs rep.

(c) Careful comm arrangements were made to ensure that Bde, Bn and Coy would be in touch with each other at all times. In addition to the normal line and R/T layouts, a line was laid to the firm base on the RIGHT (K House) from the bn swbd and a direct one-to-one line was laid from bde to the bn OP 76365830.

(d) Registration of all tgts, except one, was carried out on the three days previous to the op.

4. Plan

(a) The plan was simple; it consisted of the following:

(b) One pl from D Coy was to be launched from IMTHAL 77335838 on to its objective area 4. Its route was straight down the rd.

(c) On the RIGHT a recce patrol was to find out if K house was occupied. If NOT occupied a pl from the assaulting coy was to occupy the house 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ hrs prior to H hr. The remaining pls were to form up to the RIGHT and LEFT of K house in the rear at 767578 and pl posn 767580, respectively, and commence to move at H-1 min. These were to move to Xrds 77235770 and clear the houses on either side of the rd. If no enemy were found they were to attack to area 5 and clear the posn and secure a PW.

(d) As soon as a PW was captured pls were instructed to return as rapidly as possible to their own lines.

(e) A very careful fire plan, designed to "squash" all known fire posns. HQs, get-away routes, etc, was drawn up, (Copy attached). Less than 50% HE and smoke, originally allotted, was used in the initial fire plan. This would permit the repetition of any serials in case of unforeseen circumstances.

(f) H hr was set for 0830 hrs.

5. Narrative of Events

(a) At H hr the fire came down on schedule and on tgt, except in one case. Rounds destined for Serial 5 fell short and greatly hindered the launching of the pl from D Coy from IMTHAL. Eventually this fire ceased and the pl got under way at H plus 4 instead of H. It reached the houses at 777582 but then came under hy fire from 777585, 778582, and from comm trench at 77815835, and arty fire from the REICHSWALD FOREST. This pl could NOT get ahead and was withdrawn by the CO. One member of the pl was wounded slightly.

(b) On the RIGHT a sec occupied K house at 0300 hrs and reported no sign of enemy there or at houses Xrds, 77235770. At 0615 hrs 13 pl moved to K house to establish the firm base. At the same time 15 pl moved to area of house at 767578 and 10 minutes later 14 pl moved to posn at 767580. At H plus 1 both pls moved off towards their objective.

(i) Right - 15 pl

A trip flare was set off in the FUP but fortunately it brought no fire. The pl moved very fast toward its objective and reached a pt approx 10 yds from the trenches at 77505757 when the enemy opened up with Schmeissers and grenades wounding two men. The pl quickly moved through the trench and into the first house clearing Huns as it went. The occupants of a dugout nearby who refused to come out, except for one, were rapidly disposed of with grenades. The pl stayed on its objective for only 5 minutes in which time it took 5 PW and killed approx 5 to 8 more.

The return to K house involved no difficulties as the pl walked down the rd without a shot being fired at them, undoubtedly the result of the carefully prepared fire plan, which was still in progress.

(ii) Left - 14 pl

Some of the rounds presumably destined for Serial 5 fell around K house which meant that the adv of this pl was held up for a few minutes. However when the pl got started it reached its objective at 77675757 in a very short time. At the first house they were fired on by riflemen. These were cleaned up together with other tps in the immediate area making a definite total of 4 killed and probably more. The pl brought back 5 PW incl 1 offr; it suffered no cas.

(c) With the exception of the short rounds already mentioned the whole fire plan was excellent. This applied particularly to the smoke, both from arty and 4.2in mortars which effectively screened the area thereby enabling the assaulting pls to return without interference.

6. Lessons Learned

(a) All arty tasks near our own tps must be registered in this climate owing to the variable nature of the weather.

(b) Careful briefing and the aggressive action of junior leaders are essential in an op of this type. If the pl and sec comds had NOT completely known what they were to do and where they were to go and, if control and aggressive action had been lacking it is very doubtful if such success could have been achieved.

(c) Speed. In all, the total time from H hr until the pls assaulting Area 5 back in K house was only 30 minutes.

(d) Controlled withdrawal. The Comd of the assaulting coy was in such a posn that he could order pls, once they had seized a PW, to return to the firm base. In fact he exercised close control over the whole op.

(e) The metal tobaggans improvised to take care of cas were NOT satisfactory. Tobaggans of the Cdn type with a canvas cover would help considerably in solving the problem of evacuating cas in such difficult conditions.

7. Total results of the raid:-

<u>GERMANS</u>	<u>Captured</u>		<u>Killed</u> (estimated)
	<u>Unwounded</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	
	7	3	11
<u>OWN TPS</u>	Nil	3	Nil

N.B. - A stray shell, presumably enemy, landed in a res coy area of the Nth NS Highrs and wounded 4 men in one dugout.

9 CDN INF BDE


FIRE PLAN

OPERATION "PAUL"

Serial	Target	Time	Unit	Type	Rate	Remarks
1	X rds 77225770	H to H + 4	Bty 14 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	Normal	
2	VOSSENDAL 77575751	H to H + 8	Two Btys 14 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	5 mins slow 3 mins normal	
3	Mortar Posn 78295720	H + 9 to H + 20	Bty 14 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V. Slow	One of Btys Serial 2.
4	Mortar Posn 78495685	H + 9 to H + 20	Bty 14 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	One of Btys Serial 2.
5	Houses near WYLER MEER 77755865	H to H + 15	Bty 12 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	Slow	
6	Cut off NORTH Route 77915790	H to H + 10	Bty 12 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	
7	Cut off Trench & a tk ditch 77895743	H + 5 to H + 10	Bty 12 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	
8	Cut off a tk ditch 78205735	H + 11 to H + 16	Bty 12 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	
9	Cook - House 78005664	H + 5 to H + 20	Bty 13 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	Suspected Mortar posn
10	Coy HQ WYLER 78175816	H + to H + 15	Bty 13 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	
11	Mortar Posn 78355860	H + 5 to H + 30	Bty 13 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	HE	V Slow	

Serial	TARGET	TIME	UNIT	TYPE	RATE	REMARKS
12	DEN HEUVEL def works 77005682	H to H + 30	Med bty RCA	HE	Slow one rd in two mins	
13	Fm 77305635	H to H + 15	Med Bty RCA	HE	Slow one rd in two mins	
14	1051 Bn HQ 78255790	H to H + 2, H + 10 to H + 11, H + 15 to H + 16, H + 20 to H + 21	Med Bty RCA	HE	Rapid	
15	Mortar Posn 78325610	H + 6 to H + 30		HE	Slow one rd in two mins	
16	DENHEUVEL Tgt 136 77185685	H to H + 25	Pl D Coy CH of O(MG)	4.2in mortar Smoke and HE	Normal	
17	DEN HEUVEL Target 137 77405660	H to H + 25	Pl D Coy CH of O(MG)	4.2in mortar Smoke and HE	Normal	
18	ZYFFLICH Target 4 78565980	H to H + 20	Pl D Coy CH of O(MG)	4.2in mortar Smoke and HE	Normal	
19	Tip of wood 77905825	H to H + 15	Pl C Coy CH of O(MG)	MMG	Short Bursts	Prevent escape or rft
20	Glider 77125748	H to H + 30	Pl C Coy CH of O(MG) plus one pl res coy	MMG	Short Bursts	
21	Rd Junc 77705812	H to H + 4	Nth NS Highrs 3 in mortars	HE	Normal	
22	Trench system 77605790	H to as re- quired	Nth NS Highrs unit weapons	SA fire	As re- quired	Obser- ved fire

Serial	TARGET	TIME	UNIT	TYPE	RATE	REMARKS
23	Trench system 77205718	H to H + 30 H to H + 20	H L I of C 4.2in Mortars 771571	SA fire Mortar		Observed From VOX- HILL 767573
24	Bldgs and woods 767563	H to H + 30	H L I of C	SA fire		Observed
25	Rd ZYFFLICH 785598 - QUER DAM 766600	H to H + 20	RIGHT bn 7 Cdn Inf Bde	SA fire & smoke		Observed
26	LITTLE TOBRUK 777615	H to H + 20	LEFT bn 7 Cdn Inf Bde	SA fire & Smoke		Observed
27	EINDJESHOF 783618	H to H + 30	LEFT bn 7 Cdn Inf Bde	SA fire		Observed
28	Mortar Posn 79365770	H to H + 30	Tp tks 27 Cdn Armd Regt	HE	V Slow	
29	Mortar Posn 79105695	H to H + 30	Tp tks 27 Cdn Armd Regt	HE	V Slow	
30	HETTSTEEG 79605540	H to H + 15	HAA	HE		
31		H + 5 on	Bty 14 Cdn Fd Regt RCA	Smoke		Bty from Ser 1. Observed As re- quired.
32		As re- quired	4.2in mortar pl less one mortar firing smoke, Serials 16 & 17	Smoke		
33	K house 77055778	As re- quired	HLI of C 3 in mortars	HE		Observed CPO with coy comd attacking
34	STONK-KRAN- ENBURG Rd 78285755	H + 5 to H + 30	Regt 2 Cdn Inf Div	HE	V Slow	
35	RICHTERS GUT 79885650	H + 15 to H + 30	HAA	HE		Switch for Serial 30



OPERATION "PAUL"

